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I. INTRODUCTION
Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia Mfrquez's mythical Macondo is
a town of fantasy where the surreal becomes quotidian. It is the
land where people lose their memory and must resort to fortune-
tellers who read their past in cards, where children of sinful unions
are born with pig's tails, and those condemned to one-hundred
years of solitude do not have a second opportunity on earth. Look-
ing at recent events in Colombian politics, one wonders whether
the life of the nation is following a script by its foremost writer.
Where else, but in Macondo, could one find a defeated rebel, his
former hostage, and the one who negotiated the hostage's release,
all presiding over the assembly writing the country's new Constitu-
tion? Where else do the people entrust members of a terrorist
group responsible for the killing of eleven Supreme Court Justices
with the task of amending the Constitution in order to strengthen
the judiciary?
Contradiction and conflict have dogged Colombia's life as a re-
public. One of its faces portrays stability. Until replaced this past
July, Colombia's 1886 Constitution was, after that of the United
States, the oldest uninterrupted constitution in the Americas. In a
part of the world dominated by militarism and regular coups, Co-
lombia has had mostly civil and elected governments and a com-
mitment to constitutional republicanism. Yet, at the same time,
wearing its profile of strife and turmoil, Colombia has suffered
through eleven civil wars between 1811 and 1957, during which few
people bothered to participate in the constitutional machinery for
democracy. Since the end of the 1953-57 military dictatorship, the
level of violence and conflict in society has only worsened. Guer-
rilla war, drug violence, and political division have risen to unprec-
edented levels.1
From one perspective, constitution-makers in Colombia have
responded to society's crises admirably. Constitutional revision has
been ongoing and frequent-popularized among the nation's elite
1. See HERNANDO VALENCIA VILLA, THE GRAMMAR OF WAR 1-2 (1986); Keith S. Rosenn,
The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin America:
An Explanation, 22 U. MAM IN'rm-Am L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
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to the level of indoor sport. So viewed, constitutional reform has
effectively and unrelentingly moved Colombia down the path of
democracy. From another perspective, and despite these appear-
ances, constitutional reform has been only a game played among
the political parties and the powerful to quell short-term squabbles
among the players. Thus, "Colombia is a blockaded society, a na-
tion besieged by republican rhetoric whose leadership seems to be
incapable or unwilling or both of sharing the state power and
opening the avenues of economic development and democratic
modernization .... -2 Though non-mainstream groups have not
been formally fenced out of government and its offices, at least
since 1974, the reality is the continuing dominance of those who
have always been in power. Instead of improving Colombian soci-
ety, constitutional reform has simply maintained the status quo
and thus has denied many Colombians access to the government,
its resources and opportunities.' These charges, made in 1986 by
Colombian constitutional scholar Hernando Valencia Villa, were
partly prophetic. From a then pervasive guerrilla war, conditions
only deteriorated over the next few years. In 1989 and 1990, how-
ever, the stalemate gave way to an unprecedented movement for
fundamental reform of the Constitution, its institutions, and the
legal system which it ordains.
While the President and his government were actively seeking
to negotiate a political peace with guerrilla groups and fighting a
bloody war against Medellin's drug leaders, a grassroots campaign
persuaded the President to permit the voters to decide in a plebi-
scite whether they wished to consider fundamental constitutional
reform. Through the convocation of an elected constituent assem-
bly, the reformers wanted, among other things, to strengthen the
judiciary and the criminal justice system. The people approved the
concept in May of 1990. Strengthened by this approval, President
C~sar Gaviria and his government broadened negotiations with
guerrilla and other political movements. As a result, the nascent
constitutional reform process involved groups formerly excluded,
even ones that until recently had operated as terrorist guerrillas.
After the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the assembly and struck down limits which the President
and political parties agreed to impose on its authority, an assembly
was elected by the people in December 1990. A new constitution
2. VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 199-200.
3. Id. at 201-02.
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was drafted and made effective by its own terms seven months
later.'
In at least one important sense, the new Colombian Constitu-
tion is a departure from the constitutional tinkering of the past
105 years-it was illegally adopted, in violation of the amending
clause of the 1886 Constitution. While its creation caused consider-
able controversy and bitterly divided the nation's Supreme Court,
the new Constitution eventually emerged amid a wave of
optimism.,
Those interested in constitutions and constitutionalism thus
have an opportunity to examine a new case of fundamental consti-
tutional reform, one which presents interesting and rich compari-
sons with the constitutional history of the United States. Like the
new Colombian Constitution, the U.S. Constitution of 1787 was
adopted in violation of its predecessor. Thus, as is the case now in
Colombia, the U.S. could not rely on its existing constitution or
any other rule in its legal system to validate a fundamental change
in society. Now, as then, illegality is all but conceded. Like the
United States did more than 200 years ago, Colombia must look
outside its legal system for principles to justify this radical break
with existing rules.'
Popular sovereignty legitimated the U.S. Constitution through
the unique device of the constituent ratifying conventions in the
states. Indeed, the U.S. constitution-makers popularized the theory
of popular sovereignty to such an extent that the idea of the peo-
ple's right to make and change their government without regard
for the existing rules of change has been widely exported. However,
popular sovereignty has taken on talismanic qualities here in the
U.S., serving at times to obscure central antidemocratic character-
istics of the Constitution.' Along with the theory, the capacity of
4. The new Constitution became effective on July 5, 1991. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE
COLOMBIA art. 380 [hereinafter COLOM. CONST.].
5. The peace that the new Constitution is expected to bring Colombians, however, may
prove elusive. Only six days after the Constitution became effective, terrorists blew up a
runway at the Caribbean resort of Cartagena and, in an unrelated incident, killed five po-
licemen in San Martin de Loba. N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1991, at A3. At the same time, attacks
against oil installations and pipelines slowed oil exports, and an unsuccessful attempt to
kidnap the Mayor of Cali (Colombia's third largest city) left two policemen dead. James
Brooke, 2 Rebel Armies Create Chaos as Colombia Longs for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1991, at A8.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 100-114.
7. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL Dis-
COURSE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1988).
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popular sovereignty to serve as political slogan rather than real
democratic ideal has also ventured abroad. Not surprisingly, the
Colombian assembly delegates supported their reform with the
claim that they were acting on behalf of the people. The new Con-
stitution is, from this perspective, perhaps illegal but nonetheless
valid.
The Colombian venture presents risks. Part of the political
price of a broad-based reform movement with an unusually repre-
sentative constituent assembly is constitutional provisions that are
perhaps not in the best long-term interests of Colombia-a ban on
the extradition of Colombians being the foremost example. s The
process of selecting the assembly itself was not entirely immune
from questionable politics. Three of the delegates, members of for-
merly terrorist organizations, were named by the government prior
to the elections held for the remaining seventy members. In addi-
tion, concessions guaranteeing guerrilla groups power in a new gov-
ernment could only worsen the violence if ongoing political accom-
modation is not maintained.9 It may be, however, that Colombia
had no choice. Colombians have had enough experience to realize
that constitutional reform is not a panacea, that changes in the
written law do not necessarily produce social changes. This time,
however, the nation was disintegrating, and strong measures were
essential. The seriousness of the crisis precipitated deeper reform
and a more democratic process than at any prior time in Colom-
bian history.
The test of the validity of the new Colombian Constitution is a
test of time. Constitutional legitimacy is determined by the peo-
ples' acceptance of the Constitution, the fit between the new set of
rules and society. 10 If the new charter is widely regarded as more
just, or even as necessary to solve practical problems in Colombia,
over time it will be regarded by the people as legitimate. Until
now, Colombian constitutional reform has been as much an effort
to avoid societal problems as it has been a means to solve them.
The violence and social division which grew out of inattention to
basic needs apparently caused Colombian leaders to recognize that
8. COLOM. CONST. art. 35.
9. See, e.g., COLOM. CONST. transitory art. 12 (authorizing the President to select, in his
discretion, as many congressmen as he may determine to be appropriate in representation of
demobilized guerrilla movements; congressmen so appointed need not meet the qualifica-
tions applicable to those popularly elected).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 100-114.
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a societal collapse would be inevitable without a genuine commit-
ment to a more open, democratic, and responsive government.
Part Two of this Article reviews the parallel histories of con-
stitution-making in Colombia and the United States. The compari-
son reveals a number of similarities, the most important of which
is the illegality of the pathbreaking charters in each respective so-
ciety. Part Three assesses the legitimacy-both in Colombia and
the United States-of constitutional reform outside the amending
clauses. Section A of Part Three begins by reviewing the parame-
ters of the constitutionalist's criteria for constitutional legitimacy.
Section B then traces the problem of legitimacy through two peri-
ods of constitutional crisis in the United States: the making of the
federal constitution and the enactment and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Further, Section B briefly reviews se-
lected instances of state constitution-making and the states' legacy
of making changes outside the amending clause. Section B con-
cludes by reminding the reader of the powerful role played by
American federal judges who, through the act of constitutional in-
terpretation, may effectively change the Constitution outside the
formal rules of change. Section B's lesson is that popular sover-
eignty, whether mythical or real, has legitimized much "unlawful"
constitutional change in the U.S., and that the simple and brief
federal constitution has endured for so long with relatively few
amendments, in part because the courts have construed the Con-
stitution to fit the times.
Section C assesses the legitimacy of constitutional reform in
Colombia. The starting point is the 1886 Constitution, itself
adopted under conditions of dubious legality. From there, the Arti-
cle examines the making of the 1991 Constitution, and carefully
analyzes the October 1990 decision of the Colombian Supreme
Court which, by a vote of fourteen to twelve, supported the right of
the people to have a constitutional assembly with unrestricted au-
thority to change the 1886 Constitution. The majority reached a
result consistent with democratic principles, although its rationale
is not altogether lucid. In the end, the majority recognized that the
Court's role is only to assure the procedural propriety of constitu-
tional reform undertaken within the Constitution's rules. Because
the process which produced the new Constitution stemmed from
the people's desire to change the 1886 Constitution outside its
amendment prescriptions, the Court properly concluded that it
could not impose the old constitution's legal norms to determine
[Vol. 23:1
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the validity of the new one.
Part Four concludes that it is too soon to determine the legiti-
macy of Colombia's new Constitution. The political fact of its exis-
tence is stunning, given the relative political and social chaos of
the country only months before its adoption, and the abyss of vio-
lence into which the nation had fallen. The deals erected to make
this reform possible may prove to be either acts of brave genius, or
of bold stupidity. Time will tell. What the law and lawyers can say
now is that there is ample precedent to support extra-legal consti-
tutional change in Colombia. Whether the slogan of popular sover-
eignty will be sufficient to lend momentum to popular acceptance
of the Constitution also remains to be seen. The real test of legiti-
macy, the actual acceptance by Colombians, will depend on the
new Constitution's ability to facilitate a more open, democratic,
and progressive government.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN COLOMBIA
AND THE UNITED STATES
A. From the Declaration of Independence to the U.S.
Constitution
In 1776, thirteen formerly British colonies established their
own governments after declaring independence from a sovereign
they found destructive of their "inalienable Rights" of "Life, Lib-
erty and the pursuit of Happiness."" While most of the new states
were busy drafting their own constitutions between 1776 and
1778,12 the Continental Congress spent two years drafting and ap-
proving the first national Constitution, the Articles of Confedera-
tion, which in 1777 proposed to the states "The United States of
America.""3
The Articles of Confederation were not ratified by all thirteen
states until 1781, although the Congress had been following their
modest dictates since the Declaration of Independence."' The Arti-
cles created an especially weak and rudimentary union. The only
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
12. DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15
(1990).
13. MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 239 (1940).
14. BERNARD BAILYN, DAVID B. DAVIS, DAVID H. DONALD, JOHN L. THOMAS, ROBERT H.
WIRBE & GORDON S. WOOD, THE GREAT REPUBLIC 300-04 (1977).
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central organ was a Congress, and the Congress was really a crea-
ture of the states. Each state had one vote, and delegates were cho-
sen and financed and could be recalled by the states each in their
own fashion. Moreover, the important congressional powers could
not be exercised unless nine of thirteen states assented.1 5 No
mechanism existed to enforce national decisions on the states
other than the admonition in the Articles that "every State shall
abide" by congressional decisions.1" States could and did behave as
if compliance with the Constitution was optional.1 7 Finally, the Ar-
ticles could only be amended with the consent of all thirteen
states.18 When drastic measures were eventually recommended to
strengthen national economic powers under the Articles, one recal-
citrant state could and did routinely block the change. 9
Thus, the new national government lacked power to coerce the
states or the people, and its inability to raise funds greatly hin-
dered the revolutionary war effort.2 0 After the war, foreign and do-
mestic debts could not be paid, while new foreign and domestic
trade restrictions threatened the very existence of the Confedera-
tion.2 Many state governments were corrupt and inefficient, and
some states began to take advantage of convenient ports or cheap
goods at the expense of neighboring states. When trade wars devel-
oped, Congress was powerless to intervene.22
Eventually, important trading states sought to make agree-
ments to facilitate commerce. Although the Articles specified that
any trade agreements must be approved by Congress,23 some states
proved willing to participate in a general trade convention without
congressional authorization or ratification. At Annapolis, Mary-
land, in 1786, delegates of five states met, but only for three days.2 '
They concluded that action on trade problems was "inadvisable"
in light of "so partial and defective a representation."2 Instead,
moved by the need to reach a broad interstate agreement on trade,
the delegates at Annapolis reported to the legislatures of their
15. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. X (1781).
16. Id. art. XIII.
17. BAILYN, supra note 14, at 325-28.
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII (1781).
19. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 24-25.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. BAELYN, supra note 14, at 325-29.
23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI (1781).
24. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 25-26.
25. Id. at 26.
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states a broader agenda. Their report noted "important defects in
the System of the Federal Government" which were "of a nature
so serious as . . .to render the situation of the United States deli-
cate and critical .... ,,2" They called for a meeting in Philadelphia
in May of 1787 of delegates of all the states "to take into Consider-
ation the situation of the United States to devise such further Pro-
visions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitu-
tion of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the
Union."27 Their resolution called for the Philadelphia product to
be reported to Congress, and, after congressional agreement, for
the changes to be sent for ratification in every state (as contem-
plated by the amending clause of the Articles).
After some delay, Congress adopted a resolution in favor of
the Philadelphia Convention in terms echoing the Annapolis reso-
lution, except for the narrowing specification that the Convention
was "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation. ' 2 Before the date set for the Philadelphia meeting,
all of the states except New Hampshire and Rhode Island had fol-
lowed Virginia's lead by having the state legislature appoint a dele-
gation to Philadelphia. The New Hampshire delegation arrived
soon after the Convention began. Rhode Island refused to
participate.29
One charge frequently leveled against the 1787 convention is
that the delegates were motivated simply by self-interest and pro-
tection of property, theirs and that of others of their aristocratic
class.") The delegates (merchants, planters, bankers, and lawyers)
were truly the elite. They wielded great power in society due to
family ties, service in the military and in Congress, and as gover-
nors, in diplomacy and administration. In addition, their values
were not truly democratic. In fact, the delegates were openly hos-
tile to popular state legislatures and other democratic features of
the Articles. Their goals were to restrain democratic power; install
representative devices and republican government; and to insert
checks and balances in government, largely to protect their vested
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 3 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13-14
(1911).
29. MAx FA IUAN, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 10-11
(Yale Press ed. 1913).
30. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (MacMillan Press ed. 1929).
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interests in property and power. However, their elitism should be
seen in light of the larger goal of erecting a viable national govern-
ment on what was at the time weak foundations. The partisan, sec-
tional, and faction-ridden politics of the time held little hope for a
new nation; it was widely believed that the diverse society emerg-
ing in the Confederation would lead to popular upheaval or monar-
chy. Only by creating a strong national government could these
tendencies be defeated or at least checked."1
The most important events of the years 1787 to 1789 are well
known. Far from "revising" the Articles, the Philadelphia delegates
proposed a new structure of government, to be ratified by specially
elected state conventions. When New Hampshire became the ninth
ratifier in June of 1788, the Constitution became effective by its
own terms. By the spring of 1789, the new government was in place
subordinate to the new Constitution.
2
B. Adoption of the 1886 Constitution in Colombia
After gaining independence from Spain, Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama, and Venezuela became a single state: La Gran Colom-
bia." Besides Bolivar's prestige and influence, there was little to
hold together his dream of a unified Latin America that would
counter-balance the power of the United States to the North.3 '
During its brief existence, La Gran Colombia adopted at least two
constitutions, respectively in 1821 and 1830.15 The former created
a strong central government and regarded territorial divisions (de-
partments and provinces) as merely administrative units, totally
dependent on BogotA. The latter was a belated attempt to answer
the demands for regional autonomy that ultimately led to the sep-
aration of Venezuela and Ecuador. Following the secession of these
two countries, Colombia became La Nueva Granada and had be-
31. FARBmER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 24-26; Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the
Constitution, 4 CONST. COM. 57, 71 (1989).
32. See JENSEN, supra note 13, at 102-39.
33. See generally 10 Luis MARTINEZ DELGADO, ACADEMIA COLOMBIANA DE HISTORIA, His-
TORIA EXTENSA DE COLOMBIA (1970); ALFREDO VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA, El Poder Presidencial en
Colombia (Enrique Dobry ed. 1979) [hereinafter VAZQUEZ]. See also VALENCIA, supra note 1,
at 112-70.
34. See VAZQUEZ, supra note 33, at 41.
35. Some argue that the preparatory document of Angosturas (December 17, 1819), and
Bolivar's decree assuming dictatorial powers (August 27, 1828) can both be regarded as con-
stitutions. Under this view, the number of constitutions during the existence of La Gran
Colombia was four. See VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 112.
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tween 1830 and 1853 three constitutions (1832, 1843, 1853) 86 all of
which preserved a centralist form of government, although with in-
creased concessions to the provinces. The process by which territo-
rial entities increased their autonomy at the expense of Bogota's
control over local affairs gained momentum with the adoption of
the 1858 Constitution that, once again, renamed the country. The
new Confederaci6n Granadina was followed, in 1863, by the United
States of Colombia.
3 7
While a few of the constitutional changes chronicled so far
were achieved through peaceful mechanisms, most of them came in
connection with civil wars. Although only once in Colombian his-
tory has a civil war led rebels to the Presidential Palace,3 8 it has
become recurrent practice to blame civil wars on the existing con-
stitution and then change it.
Finally, in 1886, Colombia adopted the Constitution that
would provide the institutional framework of the country for the
next hundred years. The transition to this more centralist Consti-
tution, however, did not conform to the rigorous requirements of
Article 92 of the 1863 Constitution. 9 Article 92, not unlike Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation, required unanimous ratifica-
tion of amendments by the Senate of Plenipotentiaries in which
each State had one vote. Also parallel to the early U.S. experience
are President Nfifiez's attempts to dismantle the federal system
and restore central authority through the amending process. These
attempts ran aground because of the ratification rule. ° Then, in
1885, what began as an internal conflict over the legitimacy of the
36. Again, some argue that the Ley Fundamental de La Nueva Granada (November
17, 1831) was the first constitution of this period. See VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 112.
37. Name adopted .by the 1863 Constitution to identify the country and reflect its fed-
eral structure.
38. Mosquera's rebellion in 1861. See CAILos RESTRPO PIEDRAHrrA, 25 ARos DE EvOLU-
cI6N POLITICO CONsTrrucIONAL, 1950-1975, at xxi (Foreword by Alfonso L6pez Michelsen)
(1976) [hereinafter 25 Agos].
39. The Colombian Constitution provided:
This Constitution can only be amended . . . with the following formalities:
1) That the reform be requested by a majority of State Legislatures.
2) That the reform be debated and approved by both Houses...
3) That the reform be ratified by unanimous vote of the Senate of Plenipotentia-
ries in which each State has one vote.
It can also be amended in a convention called by Congress for that purpose at
the request of all State legislatures, and composed of an equal number of dele-
gates for each State.
CONSTITUCI6N DE LOS EsTADos UNIDOS DE COLOMBIA art. 92 (1863).
40. See VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 162.
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State Government in Santander, evolved into a rebellion against
the Federal Government. On June 17, in the battle of La
Humereda, the rebels inflicted a severe defeat to the loyalists.
Ironically, the steamer Maria Emma, which carried most of the
rebels' munitions and supplies, accidentally caught fire and sank
after the battle was over, carrying with it the rebels' hopes for suc-
cess. When the news reached Bogota, President Nfifiez took advan-
tage of the sudden turn of events. In a speech from the presiden-
tial house's balcony, NOfiez laconically announced that "the
Constitution of Rionegro4I has ceased to exist."4 On September
10, Nifiez issued a decree inviting the governors of the nine states
to appoint two delegates each, in order to discuss the possibility of
a new constitution. The eighteen members of the National Council
of Delegates drafted the Agreement Regarding the Bases of Consti-
tutional Reform, a document that was subsequently approved by
619 of 633 municipal councils. Article I of the Agreement conferred
upon the National Council of Delegates the status of constitutional
Convention. The Convention adopted the 1886 Constitution which,
upon its signature by the President, became effective in August of
that year. The electorate, however, had no role in the process, not
even indirectly through representation in the local legislatures that
approved the Bases, because "the municipal councils only repre-
sented the President's will."1
4 3
Under the new Constitution, the United States of Colombia
ceased to exist. The balance between national and local govern-
ments was achieved through a model defined as "administrative.
decentralization and political centralization." The former states
became departments, all legislative powers were vested in the na-
tional Congress;45 the judicial power was organized in a hierarchi-
cal structure with the Supreme Court at its summit;' 6 and the
President was vested with all executive powers.' 7 At the local level,
the executive power in each department was to be exercised by
governors48 freely appointed and removed by the President. Gover-
41. Name given to the 1863 Constitution, after the city where it was adopted.
42. See VAzQuEz, supra note 33, at 15.
43. 1 CARLos E. RESTREPO, ORIENTACI6N REPUBLICANA 110 (1972), quoted in 1 DIEGO
URIBE, CONsTrrucIONES DE COLOMBIA 182 (1977).
44. COLOM. CONST. OF 1886, art. 5.
45. Id. art. 76.
46. Id. art. 136.
47. Id. art. 120.
48. Id. art. 181.
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nors, in turn, would appoint and remove mayors.49
Between 1886 and 1957, Colombia underwent three successive
periods of radically partisan governments. The Conservative Party
clung to power until 1930, and in the process successfully fought
two more civil wars against the Liberal Party. In 1930, the eco-
nomic depression and a split of conservative votes between two
candidates opened the door for the Liberals' return to the Presi-
dency. After four consecutive periods of liberal governments, Con-
servative Mariano Ospina assumed the Presidency.
On April 9, 1948, the assassination of Jorge Eli6cer Gaitin
(one of the defeated Liberal candidates in the 1945 election) trig-
gered the violent popular uprising known as El Bogotazo. Reacting
to the rebellion, the government unleashed a campaign of repres-
sion against Liberals that grew to a state of undeclared civil war
known as La Violencia. On November 9, 1949, when the House of
Representatives announced its intention to impeach the President,
Ospina responded by closing Congress and dispatching the army to
prevent its members from convening. Amid the prevailing climate
of repression, the Liberal Party refused to take part in the 1949
election and a Conservative (Laureano G6mez) was elected for the
1950-54 presidential period.
The new President promptly created an all-Conservative Con-
gress that enacted Legislative Act 1 of 1952, which convened a con-
stitutional assembly to reform the 1886 Constitution. None of the
sixty-two members of this assembly was to be popularly elected.
Meanwhile, the civil war had reached degrees of violence never
before known in the country's history. On June 13, 1953, a military
coup under the direction of Gustavo Rojas toppled the government
and promised to restore peace. The dictatorship, initially wel-
comed as a necessary short term measure to rescue the country
from chaos and lawlessness, soon settled into a permanent military
government. Taking advantage of the constitutional assembly con-
vened by G6mez, Rojas had the assembly "legitimize" his taking of
the Government,"0 and appoint him President for the 1954-58 pe-
riod. In 1957, when Rojas was maneuvering to have himself ap-
pointed for a third period, G6mez and Alberto Lleras (leader of the
49. Id. art. 194. Legislative Act 1 of 1986 eliminated governors' power to appoint may-
ors, and made the latter elective officers. Acro LEGISLATIVO No. 1 DE 1986 (Colom.) (In
Colombian constitutional law, amendments to the constitution are called "Legislative
Acts").
50. Acro LEGISLATiVO No. 1 DE 1953 (Colom.).
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Liberal Party) met in Spain and agreed to cooperate to secure a
- return to constitutionalism. Overcoming old political rivalry, the
two leaders agreed on the creation of the National Front, a system
in which, during the next sixteen years, public offices would be
equally split between Liberals and Conservatives. According to the
agreement, the constitutional amendment needed to implement
the National Front "requires popular approval. A new constitu-
tional assembly would be seen with utmost alarm. For this reason,
we are of the opinion that the most expeditious and effective pro-
ceeding, and also the most democratic. . . is that the amendments
be subject to popular approval or rejection through a plebiscite. '5 1
Ironically, and notwithstanding the democratic plea of the 1957
agreement, the 1886 Constitution did not provide for amendment
by plebiscite.
On May 10, 1957, faced with overwhelming but peaceful civil-
ian opposition, Rojas relinquished power, left the country, and ap-
pointed a military junta to govern. The junta, acting in coordina-
tion with the two political parties, held the December 1, 1957,
plebiscite in which the people declared that the Constitution of the
country was that of 1886 subject to both the amendments adopted
by 1947 and those adopted through the plebiscite. Among the lat-
ter, Article 13 provided: "Henceforth, constitutional reforms can
only be made by Congress, in the manner established by Article
218 of the Constitution,"52 which in turn provides that constitu-
tional amendments can only be introduced by Legislative Acts
passed by Congress in two consecutive sessions.
After 1957, several amendments were adopted. Two of them
never became effective: Legislative Act 2 of 1977 and Legislative
Act 1 of 1979. By the former, Congress authorized the creation of a
constitutional assembly that would revise and amend the Constitu-
tion without being subject to the constraints of Article 218. Prior
to 1978, the Colombian Supreme Court had held that its duty
under Article 214 to "guard the integrity of the Constitution" 's did
not include the judicial review of constitutional amendments be-
cause they were not mentioned in the list of enactments subject to
the Court's scrutiny. 4 In its decision of May 5, 1978,55 the Court
51. 25 Afos, supra note 38, at 54.
52. COLOM. CONST. art. 13 (1886).
53. COLOM. CONST. OF 1886, art. 214.
54. Decision of Oct. 28, 1955, Corte Suprema, 81 Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] 362 (Colom.);
Decision of Nov. 28, 1957, 84 G.J. 430 (Colom.).
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held the proposed assembly unconstitutional, concluding that to
guard the integrity of the Constitution necessarily implied protect-
ing the integrity of Article 218.56 Relying on Article 2 of the Con-
stitution,57 the Court distinguished between primary and second-
ary (or derivative) constituent powers.58 Only the people have
primary or "sovereign" powers.5 9 Congress' powers are merely de-
rivative and, therefore, must be exercised in conformity with the
terms of the grant."'
On November 3, 1981, the Court invalidated Legislative Act 1
of 1979.61 Although the actual holding was narrow, striking the Act
for procedural defects in its adoption,6 2 the Court intimated in dic-
tum that in amending the Constitution, Congress may be subject
to more than merely procedural constraints. The Court said that,
at least theoretically, constitutional amendments are unconstitu-
tional whenever they offend "fundamental constitutional values
that are, nonetheless, cast in none of the Constitution's clauses
.. .and that touch upon the constitution's spirit or telos." e
The emergence of Supreme Court review of constitutional
amendments made the next important event inevitable: a chal-
lenge to the validity of the amendments adopted by the 1957 plelbi-
scite. In spite of the broad dictum in the 1981 decision, the opin-
ions striking down Legislative Act 2 of 1977 and Legislative Act 1
of 1979 relied on what the Court perceived as procedural defects in
the amendment attempts. Since the plebiscitary procedure fol-
lowed in 1957 was not listed in the Constitution as a means of
amendment, would the Supreme Court hold those amendments
unconstitutional? In its decision of June 9, 1987,4 the Court held
55. Decision of May 25, 1978, Corte Suprema, 107 Foro Colombiano 408 (Colom.).
56. Id. at 424.
57. "Sovereignty essentially and exclusively resides with the nation, and from it all
public powers emanate which shall be exercised in conformity with this constitution."
COLOM. CONST. OF 1886, art. 2.
58. Decision of May 5, 1978, Corte Suprema, 107 Foro Colombiano 422 (Colom.).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 423.
61. Decision of Nov. 3, 1981, Corte Suprama, 144 G.J. 358 (Colom.).
62. The opinion offers two reasons for the decision: (1) that the integration of the
House's Committee where the project of amendment was first approved was made in viola-
tion of Article 172 of the Constitution which guarantees representation to minority political
groups, (2) that the different projects had been merged in violation of regulations concern-
ing Congress' discharge of legislative duties. 144 G.J. at 391, 401.
63. Id. at 388.




that it lacked jurisdiction to pass on the constitutionality of acts of
"political character ' 'e8 and that, in general, it would not review the
exercise of the primary constituent power."6 Declining to entertain
the challenges, the Court declared that "when the people, in exer-
cise of their sovereign and inalienable power, decide to pronounce
with regard to the constitutional statute that is to govern their
destiny, they are not, nor could they be, subject to the juristic nor-
mativeness that precedes their decision. ' '6 7
While these developments were taking place, the country was
slowly but steadily slipping into lawlessness. At least two forces
combined to this end. First, leftist guerrilla movements controlled
in the 1960s but never completely eradicated, acquired renewed
strength. Prominent among them was the M-19 group, born amid
allegations that former dictator Rojas's defeat in his 1970 presiden-
tial bid was the result of the government's fraud.6 8 Second, the rise
of Colombia to its present position as world leader in the supply of
cocaine bred a new class of criminals that the country's judiciary
was neither prepared nor equipped to combat. In 1984, hired guns
assassinated Rodrigo Lara, the Minister of Justice who had
launched an aggressive campaign to denounce and bring to justice
drug traffickers and the politicians who profited from the trade.
Lara's death was only the first in a long list of assassinations that
includes an Attorney General, twelve Justices of the Supreme
Court, hundreds of judges, lawyers and journalists, as well as
thousands of anonymous peasants caught in the middle of the war
between army and guerrillas.69 Confronted with corruption, fear,
violence, and inherently weakened by the inquisitorial system in
which judges investigate crimes, the judiciary faltered.
In early 1988, the editorial columns of the Bogotd newspaper
El Espectador (whose editor in chief was also murdered by hired
guns linked to drug kingpins) recalled the momentous circum-
stances leading to the 1957 plebiscite and suggested that the evils
caused by drug trafficking and guerrilla warfare called for a similar
65. Id. at 808.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 807.
68. The acronym M-19 stands for Movement of April 19, the day on which the allegedly
tainted elections were held. On the circumstances surrounding the "1970 presidential election
see 3 JUDITH TALBOT CAMPOS & JOHN F. MCCAMANT, CLEAVAGE SHIFT IN COLOMBIA: ANALYSIS
OF THE 1970 ELECTIONS (Harry Eckstein & Ted Robert Gurr eds. 1972).
69. Twig Mowatt, When a Hit Man Wants Out, They Take Him In, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1991, at A4.
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demonstration of popular will to amend the Constitution, primar-
ily to strengthen the judiciary. President Barco endorsed the idea.
On February 20, 1988, partisan negotiations reached an agreement
calling for the creation of a Commission of Institutional Readjust-
ment that was to draft constitutional amendments that would then
be submitted to a popular referendum. This agreement never be-
came effective, however, because the Council of State, empowered
by the Constitution" to review certain executive actions, sus-
pended the process.71
After the Council of State's decision, and in conformity with
Article 218, the Government decided to submit to Congress a pro-
posal for sweeping constitutional amendments. The 1988 session of
Congress approved the Government's project with significant mod-
ifications. In 1989, when the amendments were being debated anew
according to Article 218, the House of Representatives, responding
to public demands by drug traffickers, included in the proposed
new Constitution an absolute ban on the extradition of Colombi-
ans. Faced with this turn of events, President Barco, who had
launched an aggressive law-enforcement campaign that relied
heavily on extradition to the U.S. of drug traffickers indicted in
American courts, decided to withdraw the project.
The House of Representative's handling of the proposed 1989
amendment dampened hopes that the established political institu-
tions would be up to the task of constitutional change. It was time
for the people to act. Early in January, 1990, students of the Law
School at the prestigious El Rosario University took to the streets
seeking to build popular support for the idea of constitutional re-
form through a popularly elected assembly. The popular move-
ment was successful. For the second time in his presidency, Barco
was willing to entertain the suggestion of a process for constitu-
70. COLOM. CONST. OF 1886, art. 141.
71. Decision of May 12, 1988, Corte Suprema, 17 J. & D. 593 (Colom.). The Council of
State, in the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, reviews actions falling within the
category of an "administrative act." Although a full explanation of that concept is beyond
the scope of this paper, it suffices to say that the agreement was found to be an administra-
tive act within the Council's jurisdiction. Through it, President Barco exercised his Execu-
tive powers to convene an extraordinary session of Congress to choose the members of the
Commission of Institutional Readjustment from lists prepared by the President. According
to Article 153 of the Administrative Code, the Council of State may suspend administrative
acts that are preparatory of a definitive act that would be unconstitutional and preclude the
Executive from implementing the final act. The decision characterizes the agreement as pre-
paratory of a definitive act that would be unconstitutional (a constitutional amendment
adopted without complying with Article 218 of the Constitution) and suspends it.
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tional amendment outside formal existing rules. In light of his pre-
vious frustrated attempt, Barco must have realized that over-
whelming popular support had to be shown for the idea to succeed.
Taking advantage of the upcoming May 27, 1990 presidential
election, Barco issued Decree 927 which directed the electoral au-
thorities to tally, together with the votes cast for President, the
voters' answers to the following question: "In order to strengthen
participatory democracy, do you vote for the convocation of a con-
stitutional assembly representative of all social, political, and re-
gional forces of the Nation, democratically and popularly elected
to reform Colombia's Political Constitution?"
On May 25, 1990, the Supreme Court upheld the Decree, 72 re-
jecting, among others, charges raised by the country's Attorney
General.73 Carefully reading the language of Decree 927, the Court
concluded that it merely assigned to certain public officers the
clerical task of counting votes. 4 For the Court, the Decree was not
a constitutional reform, nor did it call for a plebiscite or a referen-
dum. 5 Denying that Decree 927 had any constitutional effect, the
Court asserted that it could not pass on the validity of the convo-
cation of a constitutional assembly because such act "has not oc-
curred, nor can it be said that it will occur with the affirmative
vote of a majority of the population. '7 6
One of the arguments raised by the Attorney General against
the constitutionality of Decree 927 was that it did not constitute a
proper exercise of presidential powers. According to Article 121 of
the Constitution, the President has, in case of domestic strife, au-
thority to exercise, "in addition to those powers granted by domes-
tic law, such others as the Constitution grants for times of war or
of disturbance of the public order, and those which, in accordance
with the Law of Nations exist in time of war."' 77 This provision,
72. Decision of May 25, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 542 (Colom.).
73. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. In Colombia the Attorney General is
elected by Congress, and is not a member of the President's Cabinet.
74. 19 J. & D. at 546.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. It has always been understood in Colombian constitutional law, that among the
powers the President may exercise under Article 121 is that of issuing decrees that have the
force of laws. Although the Constitution does not grant this power expressly, it provides
that the Executive can temporarily suspend the applicability of some acts of Congress. A
pre-condition to the exercise of these legislative powers is that the President issue a decree
declaring that the "public order is disturbed and that the whole or a part of the country is
in a State of Siege." COLOM. CONST. OF 1886, art. 121. In the instant case, this was done by
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according to the Attorney General, allows the President only the
authority to take measures aimed at "preserving the institutional
order, not at changing it, since [the latter] would amount to ac-
cepting the reasons of those who dissent from the constitutional
regime. '"78 Dismissing the charge, the Court recalled recent out-
bursts of criminal activity, "attributable not only to guerrilla
movements and the narco-traffic, but to other forms of organized
crime.""8 In light of this reality, the Court added:
[It is clear that the institutions] as now designed, do not suffice
to confront the diverse forms of violence they must face. It is
not that the institutions have become, per se, a destabilizing fac-
tor, but that they have lost all effectiveness and have ended up
being inadequate; they fall short when it comes to fighting forms
of intimidation and attack not even imagined a few years ago.80
Although the Court made no mention of its prior decisions
striking down Legislative Acts 2 of 1977 and 1 of 1979, it is clear
that Decree 927 was radically different from those frustrated at-
tempts to amend the Constitution. Although innocuous in nature,
Decree 927 was a masterful display of ingenuity. While leaving the
Constitution untouched, it managed to create a political engine for
change that would be hard to ignore.
Eighty-eight percent of the voters in the presidential election
of May 27, 1990 answered the President's question in the affirma-
tive.8 1 Despite this significant show of popular support, President
Barco decided to leave the implementation of the process to the
incoming government of President C6sar Gaviria. On August 2,
1990, the President-elect and the leaders of those political move-
ments whose candidates received in the aggregate ninety-six per-
cent of the votes cast on May 27, signed a political agreement pur-
porting to establish the rules to be followed in amending the 1886
Constitution.82 The most significant points of this agreement
Decree 1038 of 1984. All decrees issued under Article 121 are subject to automatic judicial
review by the Supreme Court. Id.
78. Decision of May 25, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 543 (Colom.).
79. Id. at 545.
80. Id.
81. See text preceding supra note 72. The dissenters, looking at the high rate of absten-
tionism among the electorate, observed that the result was not endorsed by a majority of the
citizens entitled to vote. Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 985, 986
(Colom.), citing Presidential Decree 1926 of 1990.
82. Besides the triumphant Liberal Party, the other signatories of the agreement were




1. The President would issue a decree convoking the electorate
to decide whether to convene a constitutional assembly. If the vote
was in the affirmative, the electorate would then elect its members
and determine the limits of their powers.
2. The assembly could not revise parts of the Constitution not
listed in the agreement, "and, particularly, it could not modify the
period of those [officials] elected [in 1990], or matters that affect
obligations of the Colombian State by virtue of international trea-
ties, or the Republican System of Government." The second of
these restrictions precluded the assembly from tampering with the
U.S.-Colombia 1979 Extradition Treaty s8 and thus reaffirmed
Barco's determination to disassociate the constitutional reforms
from the drug traffickers' demands for a ban on extradition.
3. The assembly would otherwise have powers to modify con-
stitutional provisions dealing with a long list of subjects that the
agreement spelled out in great detail and that covered practically
every imaginable aspect of the country's institutional framework.
Consistent with the above mentioned restrictions, the extended
enumeration of topics that the assembly could consider did not in-
clude any reference to the extradition of Colombians.
4. There would be seventy members in the assembly, all
elected by the people on December 9, 1990. In addition, the gov-
ernment could appoint two or more in representation of guerrilla
organizations that were, at that time, demobilized and negotiating
the return of their members to civil life.
5. With the exception of the representatives of guerrilla orga-
nizations above-mentioned, nobody being tried for criminal acts, or
requested for extradition, or serving time for a prior conviction,
could be elected to the assembly.
6. In the first ten days of meetings, the assembly would adopt
procedural regulations to be followed in the adoption of the
amendments.
7. The final product of the assembly's deliberations would be
Alvaro G6mez, and recipient of the second highest number of votes in the presidential elec-
tion), the M-19 Democratic Alliance Movement (name adopted by the former M-19 guerrilla
group after its metamorphosis into a political party), and the Conservative Party.
83. Treaty of Sept. 14, 1979, entered in force March 4, 1982, not published in TIAS.




subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court for the sole pur-
pose of verifying that the amendments did not invade subjects be-
yond the assembly's competence and that they were adopted in
compliance with the internal rules of the assembly.
On August 24, 1990, President Gaviria issued Decree 1926,84
convoking the electorate in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment of August 2. In addition, Decree 1.926 announced rules con-
cerning the nomination of candidates to the assembly, the judicial
review of the results of the election, and other related matters.
Pursuant to Article 121 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
undertook its obligatory constitutional review of Decree 1926 and
on October 9, 1990 upheld it by the narrowest possible margin .8
Fourteen justices found most of the Decree consistent with the
Constitution about to be amended, while twelve others would have
held it unconstitutional. The most significant aspect of the deci-
sion, however, is that the majority struck down all limitations on
the assembly's powers which were listed in the political agreement
of August 2nd and later incorporated in Decree 1926. For all prac-
tical purposes, after the Court's decision, the assembly was to have
the primary sovereign power.
Apparently conceding that the proposed mechanism to amend
the Constitution did not conform with either Article 13 of the 1957
Plebiscite or Article 218, the Court affirmed that:
[the law's] ontological being is found in the realm of values thus
demanding the inquiry into the utility or inutility of legal norms
to accomplish certain ends that are deemed valuable to the com-
munity .... One of those values is peace, not only universally
recognized as such, but expressly mentioned in the preamble to
our Constitution ....
Therefore, for philosophical and jurisprudential reasons, in or-
der to determine whether [Decree 1926] is constitutional, it is
not enough to confront it with arts. 218 of the Constitution and
13 of the [1957] plebiscite; [it is necessary] to take into account
its virtuality to bring peace. Although it is impossible to assure
that the Decree will necessarily lead to the longed for peace, this
Court cannot foreclose that possibility. 6
84. This Decree, like its predecessor, Decree 927, was issued in reliance on the powers
given to the President by Article 121 of the Constitution.
85. Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 985 (Colom.).
86. Id. Compare what the same justices had said only five months before in the decision
upholding Decree 927: "It is not the task of this Court to evaluate the convenience of the
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After spelling out the moral, extra-constitutional basis for its
decision, the Court also relied on more traditional principles of
constitutionalism. Arguing that the primary constituent power
rests with the people, the majority reasoned that the people can,
at any time, adopt a new constitution without being subject to the
limitations imposed by the prior constitution.8 The only restric-
tions binding the primary constituent power are those that the
people themselves decide to abide by. 9 Were it otherwise, the
Court reasoned, one would reach the "absurd conclusion" that the
1886 Constitution was invalid because it was not adopted con-
forming to the amendment provisions of its 1863 predecessor.9
Then, taking a new look at the vote of the May 27 plebiscite,
the Court concluded that by voting "yes" the people had simulta-
neously triggered and established the limitations to their constitu-
ent power.9 1 According to the majority, the plebiscite's question it-
self,92 limited the electorate's power to amend the Constitution by
requiring that the amendments be made (1) for the purpose of
strengthening the democratic system of government, and (2)
through a mechanism representative of all national forces.9 Other
restrictions contained in Decree 1926, notably those listing the per-
missible subjects of the reform and limiting the assembly's compe-
tence, were not the result of people's self-determination, but of the
political agreement of August 2nd. Consequently, they were
unconstitutional.
9 4
The October 9, 1990 decision does not unequivocally deter-
mine who holds the primary constitution-making power. The opin-
ion overtly proclaims that "the nation, that is, the people who in-
habit this country, is the primary constitution-maker from whom
all derivative or constituted powers emanate." ' Nevertheless,
measure taken [by the Government], nor is it to predict whether with that measure the
situation of crisis will be overcome or if, on the contrary, it will turn out to be a new frustra-
tion; [the Court's] task is limited to the application of the legal norm. Decision of May
25, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. at 545 (Colom.).
87. The Court found this principle in Article 2 of the Constitution. See supra note 57
and accompanying text.
88. Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 985, 1000 (Colom.).
89. Id. at 1001.
90. Id. at 1000.
91. Id. at 1001.
92. See text preceding supra note 72.
93. Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J.& D. 985, 1001 (Colom.).
94. Id. at 1002.
95. Id. at 1000.
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other parts of the opinion seem to suggest that such power rested
with the assembly, that the assembly's power was not derivative or
constituted, but was itself the primary constituent power. In this
respect, the Court not only characterized the assembly as being
"sovereign,"" but, more significantly, it struck down as an inap-
propriate limitation on the primary constitution-maker97 the re-
strictions embodied in Decree 1926. These substantive and proce-
dural limitations provided that:
[O]nce approved by the assembly, [the text of the amendments]
will be sent to the Supreme Court of Justice [and this tribunal
will decide] whether the amendments, in whole or in part, con-
form to the list of subjects approved by the citizens ... on De-
cember 9, 1990. In addition, [regulations adopted by the assem-
bly for its own functioning] will expressly indicate those
procedural requirements the compliance with which will also be
subject to the Court's control."
While this language created judicial review ONLY FOR THE ASSEM-
BLY'S ACTS and not for the people's decision to create the assembly,
the Court struck it down, reasoning that it allowed the judiciary
"to revise acts of the primary constitution-maker." 99 Consistent
with the Court's holding that the only valid limitations on the as-
sembly's powers were those adopted by the May 27 popular deci-
sion, the majority could have said that it would review the acts of
the assembly only in light of these limitations, and for procedural
defects. The Court's reluctance to review the acts of the assembly,
even for their procedural propriety, suggests that the majority in-
terpreted the process that began on May 27 as vesting in the as-
sembly primary constitution-making power.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF EXTRA-LEGAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
A. Some Parameters
Because constitutions are made to last, they generally contain
amending mechanisms to preserve their integrity and protect them
from being overridden. Sometimes, however, because the amend-
ment process is too difficult, or because sweeping changes are
96. Id. at 1004.
97. Id. at 1006.




sought, constitutional reform occurs outside the prescribed amend-
ment method. When an attempt is made to set aside an old consti-
tution, the source of validity of the new one can hardly be found in
its predecessor. Logically, a quest for authority legitimizing funda-
mental constitutional reform is paradoxical. Either the former con-
stitution was the supreme law of the land, in which case a new
constitution made in violation of its rule of change cannot be
valid,'00 or it was not, in which case the basic premise upon which
constitutions are framed is illusory. Despite logic, however, history
shows that fundamental constitutional changes do occur and more
importantly, are accepted as valid.
Intuitively, it may be easier to brush aside the question of au-
thority when the new constitution follows an act of rebellion.
Since, by definition, rebellions cannot be governed by pre-estab-
lished rules, neither can the revolutionaries' attempt to re-institute
legal order. There is a legitimizing power to revolution. But, when
the transition from one constitutional order to the other is not ac-
companied by bloodshed and open rebellion, when the historic se-
quence of events does not show an abrupt rupture between prior
and subsequent legal orders, is the change revolutionary?
If revolutionary change occurs where "the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order in an illegiti-
mate way, that is in a way not prescribed by the first order it-
self,"101 then any time the rule for change is ignored, revolutionary
100. Logic dictates that, within a legal system, the validity of a new rule can only be
assessed in light of pre-existing rules in effect at the time the enactment takes place. Con-
fronted with this issue, the Colombian Supreme Court held:
Were we to accept that constitutional amendments are to be examined in light
of their own normativity, each new reform would become a breach in the legal
order because the natural continuity according to which a new constitution or
amendment must find support in the old constitution would no longer exist...
amending clauses would become innocuous, superfluous.
Law born from or created by a revolution cannot be judged in light of the pre-
existing legal order because the essence of a revolution is, precisely, the destruc-
tion and change of the existing juristic order.
Decision of Nov. 3, 1981, Corte Suprema, 144 G.J. 387 (Colom).
101. 1 HANs KELSEN, 20TH CENTURY PHLOSOPHY SERsES: THE GENEAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 117 (Aners Wedber trans., 1945). In determining whether a revolution has oc-
curred, Kelsen adds:
it is . . . irrelevant whether or not th[e] replacement is effected through a vio-
lent uprising against those individuals who so far have been the "legitimate"
organs competent to create and amend the legal order. It is equally irrelevant
whether the replacement is effected through a movement emanating from the
mass of the people, or through action from those in government positions. From
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change has occurred and legitimacy itself is in issue. According to
this view, there is no conceptual difference between the process of
adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1777, and that of the
1787 Constitution, or between the adoption of the 1886 and 1991
Colombian Constitutions. Inasmuch as all these processes entail
the replacement of pre-existing constitutional orders by means
which they themselves did not sanction, they all may be regarded
as illegal and revolutionary. More importantly, in each instance the
legitimacy of the revolutionary change must be determined by ref-
erence to criteria outside the legal system. This is because each
legal system has its own first principle, a criterion that determines
the legitimacy of all other rules. This criterion can be referred to,
in H.L.A. Hart's terminology, as the rule of recognition of the sys-
tem.10 The rule of recognition assesses valid law, but is not itself
validated by prior law. The only possible question about this rule
is factual-its own existence. 103 In addition, the legal system also
contains procedural rules that dictate how changes to pre-existing
law can be introduced.104 The connection between the rule of rec-
ognition and rules of change is obvious since one of the criteria
used to assess the validity of a new rule is its conformity with the
rules governing its enactment. 08 Compliance with the rules of
change, however, does not suffice to ensure the validity of the new
law.
For Hart, all rules, including the rule of recognition, persist in
a legal system only because and so long as they are accepted by the
people. Acceptance of a rule occurs when the members of the soci-
ety regard the behavior required by the rule "as a general standard
to be followed by the group as a whole."'" Mere convergence of
behavior does not suffice, since this is also a feature of social hab-
its' 0 7 but universal compliance is not necessary. 08 Citizens must
recognize the conduct required by the rule as a pattern to which
a juristic point of view, the decisive criterion is that the order in force is over-
thrown and replaced by a new order in a way that the former had not itself
anticipated.
Id.
102. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 92, 102 (1961) [hereinafter HART CoNcEPr];
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 359 (1983).
103. HART CONCEPT supra note 102, at 245.
104. Id. at 93.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id. at 54.
108. Id.; see also KELSEN, supra note 101, at 119-20.
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behavior must conform, and that failure to live up to the pattern
justifies the imposition of the consequences prescribed by the
rule.109 In modern society it is impractical to demand from all citi-
zens the degree of legal knowledge that this notion of acceptance
requires. For this reason, in complex contemporary legal systems,
acceptance is confined to such an understanding by "the officials or
experts of the system; the courts which are charged with the re-
sponsibility of determining what the law is, and the lawyers whom
the ordinary citizen consults when he wants to know what it is. ' '11
The people "manifest [their] acceptance, largely, by acquiescence
in the results -of these official operations." ' However, they can al-
ways withdraw their acceptance-a revolution may occur." 2
Thus, assessing the legitimacy of a fundamental constitutional
change is necessarily complex. The measurement of acceptance is
prone to all sorts of subjective influences in modern societies. The
views of officials and that of citizens must be taken into account,
allowing for varying social factors related to wealth, race, religion,
regional differences, cultural and ethnic differences, and the like.
As difficult as it is, the efficacy of fundamental constitutional
change must refer not only to these variables, but others as well,
such as societal traditions, patterns of social organization, and
moral principles.1 3
In sum, although constitutional reform outside of the amend-
ment process may be contradictory, the contradiction is not illegit-
imate if it is accepted. Just as contracting parties may ignore a
clause forbidding revocation of a contract by agreeing to a new
contract that derives its authority from the agreement of the par-
ties, a new constitution may derive its authority from a source
outside the formal legal system. It is critical to Hart's theory that
acceptance may follow an illegal act; it can catch up. 14 Constitu-
tions which are adopted in violation of the instructions authorizing
their drafting, just like unpopular judicial opinions, may gain va-
lidity over time, depending on their acceptance.
A related comparative measure of legitimacy is the fairness of
the amending process. There is widespread agreement that consti-
109. HART CONCFPr, supra note 102, at 56.
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id. at 60.
112. Id. at 58.
113. Kay, supra note 31, at 60-61.
114. HART CONCEPT, supra note 102, at 149-50.
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tutions should not be amenable to change through the process used
for making normal legislation. In theory, amending clauses should
be made difficult enough to prevent whimsical and short-sighted
constitutional changes. They should not be so difficult, however,
that overwhelming dissatisfaction with the constitution may not
reasonably be translated into constitutional reform. If the amend-
ing process is too easy, a society cannot rely on the continuation of
its basic legal principles and traditions. If the amending process is
too difficult, it should not be assumed that the failure to amend
reflects the approval of the governed.
Acceptance theory and popular sovereignty rely heavily on the
amending clauses of constitutions. Thus, the question of how diffi-
cult the process should be is one of the most important for consti-
tutional reformers to resolve. While it is not the intention here to
suggest an optimal process for amending the Colombian or any
other constitution, one reasonable expectation to insure ongoing le-
gitimacy through consent of the governed, is that the consent re-
quired to amend the constitution should not be more difficult to
manifest than that which was required to adopt the constitution.
The remaining sections of Part Three examine the role of pop-
ular sovereignty and acceptance, and the fairness of the amend-
ment process in the validation of extra-legal constitutional changes
in Colombia and the United States. Together, these ideas have
been central to Colombian and U.S. experiences with constitu-
tional change.
B. Perspectives on Constitutional Legitimacy in the U.S.
1. The 1787 Constitution
Only a decade after a bloody revolution freed them from the
Crown, the Framers precipitated another revolt: the peaceful but
extra-legal abandonment of the nation's first charter. How did it
become possible to put into place a constitution where the will of
the people subordinated that of sovereign states and their legisla-
tures? How did the people become, in the words of James
Madison, "the fountain of all power?"' 15
Like so much of what moved the American colonists, the the-
ory of popular sovereignty has English roots and a distinctive En-
115. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 28, at 476.
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lightenment character. The English origins trace to the Magna
Carta in 1215 and to the King's acknowledgement of the concept
that written law could limit absolute authority. For the next five
hundred years, the British tradition of constitutionalism developed
to support the ideas of limited government and the protection of
individual rights.116 Although Enlightenment scholars did not
agree on the origins of sovereignty, some concluding that it was
merely a reflection of raw power and others arguing that consent of
the governed was a prerequisite, they did abandon the previous di-
vine right theories.
1 7
For the colonists, and later the state and federal constitution-
makers, the Enlightenment tradition offered the best of both
worlds. It provided a wealth of philosophical guidance on develop-
ing a new government which their distance from Europe-both
physical and intellectual-allowed them to ignore or embrace to
best suit their interests. Gradually, the political thinkers, many of
them eventual Framers, developed a distinct political
consciousness. 18
Perhaps the most influential political idea inherited by the
colonists was John Locke's social contract theory.1 ' It was Locke's
view that because people, by nature, are free, equal, and indepen-
dent, they can only justly be subjected to political power by their
own consent. It is advantageous for people to join and contract to
form a social community so they can ensure peace, comfort, and
safety, in life and in their property. However, they must in turn
carry the burden of being bound by the rules of the commu-
nity-the social contract.' The government that Locke would es-
tablish is limited, based on specified and agreed-upon conditions.
Thus, from the time of Locke, signs existed of a direct relationship
between the government and its people.
The colonial defiance of Britain that followed the Stamp and
Sugar Acts of 1764 and 1765 spoke not of an interference by Eng-
land with the colonies, but rather that the taxes had a "manifest
tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists."''
116. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 3.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id.
119. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988).
120. Id., 2d Treatise § 87.
121. KARL J. FRIEDRICH & ROBERT G. MCCLOsKEY, FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION xviii (1954). See also KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 17.
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Later, the First Continental Congress resolved that the colonists'
rights were based "on the immutable law of nature, the principles
of the English Constitution, and the several charters or com-
pacts. ' 122 The restraint of colonial leaders was soon overtaken by
the populism of Thomas Paine's Common Sense, which provided
the impetus for the Declaration of Independence by proclaiming
that there should be "no such a thing . . . as power of any kind,
independent of the people. 1 23 Paine's pamphlet was widely read in
the colonies; at least 300,000 copies were sold.
Perhaps the best known statement of the right of the people
as sovereign to change their government is the lofty third sentence
of the Declaration of Independence:
That to secure these Rights [to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness], Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed that when-
ever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to
institute a new Government, laying its Foundation on such Prin-
ciples, and organizing its powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
12 4
Although the right "to alter or abolish" is not to be used "for light
and transient causes," a "long train of abuses and usurpations,"
especially if "evinc[ing] a design to reduce [the people] under ab-
solute despotism," creates a duty "to throw off such government,
and to provide new guards for their future security. 12 5 The first
plan for a national government in the Articles of Confederation
was a modest one, reserving for the states their "sovereignty, free-
dom, and independence." '26 However, the intellectual and political
history of the colonies and of the independence movement reveals
an emerging acceptance, if not an embracing, of popular sover-
eignty.1 1 7 This suggests as a tenable theory that the colonies se-
ceded from Britain as a fledgling union, rather than as indepen-
dent states, in order to better protect the colonists from an
oppressive foe.'
28
122. JENSEN, supra note 13, at 66.
123. Quoted in Jack P. Greene, Paine, America, and the "Modernization" of Political
Consciousness, 93 POL. SCL Q. 73, 89 (1978).
124. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
125. Id.
126. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 11 (1781).
127. See KAmMIN, supra note 7, at 11-28.
128. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
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When the Philadelphia Convention began in 1787, popular
sovereignty was hardly an entrenched idea. Only two state consti-
tutions adopted prior to 1787 were ratified by the people, and most
were enacted through the ordinary legislative process. 129 The ac-
tual emergence of popular sovereignty at the Convention was a de-
cidedly practical phenomenon-the delegates needed to shore up
their authority to act in the radical way they proposed.130 They
wasted little time in establishing their ambitious intentions. After
settling rules of organization and procedure and establishing a se-
crecy rule, the Convention passed the first of the Virginia plan res-
olutions, calling for a national legislature, executive, and judiciary.
The Articles were thus discarded from the start.31
When the Virginia plan was introduced, two delegates, includ-
ing Patterson, author of the much less nationalist New Jersey plan,
objected because of the "want of power in the Convention to dis-
cuss and propose it."'3 2 Thereafter, Pennsylvania delegate James
Wilson sought to avoid the underlying sovereignty question when
he correctly noted that the Convention's authority to propose a
constitution was not limited, only its power to adopt it. 133 Even
more revealing was the defense of the Virginia plan and its propo-
sal for popular ratification offered by Randolph, its primary au-
thor. For Randolph, "the salvation of the Republic was at stake"
so that "it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we
found necessary... . . There are certainly seasons of a peculiar na-
ture where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this
is certainly one of them. ' 13 4 After more vigorous debate, the New
Outside Art. V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1048. See also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at
38-39. The debate over whether the states themselves became sovereign nations upon sepa-
ration from Britain also had important practical implications for property ownership. Prior
to independence, some states were granted title to immense tracts of land by the crown. If
the states gained their independence separately, previous ownership would be called into
question, a theory pressed often though unsuccessfully by those seeking to appropriate pre-
viously claimed lands between 1775 and 1784. Vested interests clearly sought to protect this
theoretical flank, a tactic consistent with the gradual drift of convention discussion away
from the relationship of the states to each other to the legitimating effect of ratification by
the people. Id. at 39-40.
129. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 38.
130. See KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 12.
131. The extra-legal character of the Convention was understood by some even before
the Convention. See 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION, IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 96 (2d ed. 1891).
132. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 28, at 178.
133. Id. at 253.
134. Id. at 255.
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Jersey plan was defeated on June 19, 1787, and the delegates
moved on to the consideration of other nationalist inventions.
Perhaps the clearest indication that the delegates did not feel
bound by their instructions is that the first proposal concerning
ratification, made on May 29, 1787, along with the original Virginia
plan resolutions, proposed approval of the changes by the Congress
and by state assemblies chosen by the people for that purpose.
35
Thus, even the original proposal bypassed the state legislatures
and did not expressly require the unanimity mandated by the Arti-
cles. However, throughout the Convention, the question of their
own authority caused the delegates great concern and produced
much discussion. Practically, these debates focused on the method
for ratifying the new constitution, although philosophically their
concern was in defining a new relationship between the people, the
states, and the nation.
After defeat of the New Jersey plan, debate over ratification
recurred on July 23, 1787, when the Convention agreed to popular
ratification along the lines of Randolph's original proposal, leaving
the drafting to the Committee on Detail."3 6 The draft of the Com-
mittee on Detail provided that the Constitution would be "laid
before the United States in Congress assembled, for their approba-
tion," and then ratified by an unspecified number of state conven-
tions.13 7 By August 30, the delegates reached the ratification sec-
tion of the Committee's draft, and they debated how many states
should ratify to make the document effective. The Convention set-
tled on nine, probably because it had been used in the Articles as a
requirement for the passage of acts of Congress. Then, the dele-
gates of eight states-against opposition from those of the remain-
ing three-agreed to delete the requirement for congressional ap-
proval. Although bitter disputes caused the issue to reemerge one
week later, no new arguments were made and the eventual Article
VII omitted any reference to congressional approval, requiring only
that nine states ratify the Constitution in conventions chosen for
that purpose. "
Reflecting its concern for the method of ratification, the Com-
mittee on Detail prepared a draft of the preamble which first
sought to preserve the dual character of sovereignty still un-
135. See JENSEN, supra note 13, at 39-42.
136. FAwRB & SHmRy, supra note 12, at 42-44.
137. Id. at 44.
138. Id. at 44-46.
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resolved from the Declaration of' Independence and the Articles.
The draft preamble began: "We the people of and the States of
* * ,,*"139 Eventually the Committee took out the "and," but that
still left the problem of ratification-if nine states could make the
constitution effective, there was no way to know in advance which
nine they would be, or whether all thirteen would ratify. The Com-
mittee of Style cleverly avoided the problem by simply omitting
the reference to the states, producing the actual preamble, "We
the People of the United States ... ."" Thus, the preamble
evolved to its finished form not through some philosophical meta-
morphosis but through clever drafting to mask an unresolved
question.
1 4 1
Lockean influence on the finished Constitution is easily seen.
The "People of the United States" ordained and established the
Constitution "in order to form a more perfect Union.'1 2 Through
the Constitution they "granted" legislative power, "vested" the
President with executive power and "vested" the courts with judi-
cial power. 14  Later amendments-imited powers of the state and
national governments and secured specific rights in the people.1 44
Although the Constitution does not contain language comparable
to the "right . . . to alter or abolish" found in the Declaration of
Independence, similar language was proposed by Madison. " In
fact, during ratification, both Madison and Hamilton argued in
The Federalist for the continued existence of such a right. 4  For
Madison the power was real and independent of the Constitution;
for Hamilton, it was mere eloquence which legally added nothing
to the Article V amending clause.
4 7
The arguments over the authority of the Philadelphia Conven-
139. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 28, at 152; see also KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 12,
21.
140. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
141. KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 12.
142. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
143. U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 1; II, § 1; III, § 1.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X, XIII-XV.
145. See HERNAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 185 (1897). Madison proposed
the following: "That the people have an indubitable, inalienable and indefeasible right to
reform or change their Government, whenever it may be found adverse or inadequate to the
purposes of its institution." Id.
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
147. See PETER Sunm, THE PARADox OF SLF,-AmENDMErN. A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OM-
NIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 226 (1990).
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tion to do more than propose amendments to the Articles of Con-
federation continued in the ratification debates. In the Virginia
Convention, for example, Patrick Henry renewed his charge that
the authority to create a new constitution could be given only by
the states, not by the people:
What right had [the delegates] to say, We the people? My polit-
ical curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public
welfare, leads me to ask, Who authorized them to speak the lan-
guage of We the people, instead of, We, the states? . . .The
people gave them no power to use their name. That they ex-
ceeded their power is perfectly clear.1""
One response to the critics was that of Wilson: the Convention
merely proposed changes, and popular ratification would legitimate
anything the Convention proposed, even if the changes usurped
the authority given in the Articles. ' 9 This argument, of course,
merely conceded the Convention's lack of legal authority.
Madison's argument in response to the critics was legal but uncon-
vincing. For Madison, the Convention did have the express author-
ity to propose a wholly new Constitution. He found authority in
the Annapolis Convention and congressional resolutions for the
Philadelphia Convention "to frame a national government, ade-
quate to the exigencies of government, and of the Union; and to
reduce the Articles of Confederation into such form as to accom-
plish these purposes."150 Thus, the new Constitution was an "alter-
ation," albeit a substantial one, of the Articles.151 But was the new
constitution a "revision" as contemplated by the congressional res-
olution? Hardly.
The adoption of the Constitution violated the amending pro-
cess of the Articles of Confederation. First, it omitted the state leg-
islatures and breached the unanimity requirement. 2 Second,
while the delegates submitted their work to Congress, it was not
submitted for its approval as required by the Articles. To avoid the
awkwardness of "decreeing its own demise," Congress sent the
148. Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), 3 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 22-23
(emphasis in original).
149. See Wilson's remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (December 4,
1787), in 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 470 (2d ed. 1891).
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 260-62 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
151. Id. at 260-61.
152. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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Constitution to the states' legislatures without an "approval or dis-
approval."' The delegates candidly admitted that they were vio-
lating the Articles' amending clause. Randolph appealed to "neces-
sity," and argued that the new and stronger national government
was essential to the preservation of the union;" 4 Madison made
similar claims in The Federalist.5 The fact that in the end the
preamble was accepted without question simply strengthens the
conclusion that the delegates knew that they had broken from the
confines of the Articles.
Eventually Congress and all thirteen states did ratify the Con-
stitution, this within two years after the ninth state had acted. Did
the ratification by Congress and the thirteen states retroactively
validate the Constitution as proper amendments to the Articles?
Although such claims have been made by some who would other-
wise reject the Constitution as illegals1 5  these apologists miss the
point. No doubt, the Philadelphia delegates violated their man-
date, 57 but the making of the U.S. Constitution was more than
illegal-it was revolutionary. The revolutionary Constitution was
ratified according to its own terms and it then began to serve as
the charter for the nation. An assessment of its legality is simply
irrelevant. The Convention's work lacked political legitimacy, but
the'Convention was not a government. The delegates hoped to and
did persuade the voting public. At the very least, they initiated a
dialogue between the people as electorate and ultimate sovereign.
Only a developing acceptance by the people has given the Consti-
153. MERRMUL JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121 (Louis L. Sny-
der ed. 1964).
154. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 352-56, 499-502, 532-34.
155. THE FEDMRALIST, No. 40, at 265 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
[The delegates] must have reflected that in all great changes of established gov-
ernments forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such
cases to the former would render nominal and nugatory, the transcendent and
precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," since it is impossible
for the people spontaneously and universally, to move in concert towards their
object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some in-
formal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable
citizen or number of citizens.
Id.
156. See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, Changing Constitutional Phases, 19 B.U. L. REv.
509, 511-12 (1939).
157. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YAuL L.J. 1013, 1017-23 (1984); John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40
STAN. L. Rev. 181 (1987); Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COM.
57 (1987); but see Amar, supra note 128, at 1048.
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tution legitimacy. The Civil War remains in our collective memory
as proof of the legitimating power of popular consent.
2. Two Centuries Under the Constitution
There have been hundreds of proposals to modify the Article
V amending clause"'8 and countless judicial challenges alleging
that amendments were inconsistent with the Constitution."', Yet,
Article V remains intact and the courts have never questioned the
failure of the Philadelphia Convention to follow the instructions of
the Articles of Confederation. I60
While constitutional tension has been a recurring factor of life
in the United States, two important national traits have helped
preserve the Constitution intact. The first is the institution of judi-
cial review along with the great power of the federal courts to in-
terpret the Constitution to accommodate changing conditions and
new problems. The second characteristic is the American tendency
to ignore illegality in the service of practical ends. The Union
nearly ended with the Civil War when neither the Constitution nor
public officials could peacefully put an end to the horrors of slav-
ery. In patching up the Union after the War, Congress effectively
forced constitutional change on the Southern states by abusing the
amendment process of Article V. As with the flaws in the events of
1787-1791, these improprieties were overlooked. A brief review of
this phenomenon follows.
158. Article V of the U.S. Constitution permits amendments by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses of Congress or in a convention called by the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states, followed in either case by ratification by legislatures or conventions in three-fourths
of the states. Article V has never been amended, although limitations on the amending
power contained in the Article-regarding slavery and state representation in the Sen-
ate-were lifted in 1808 by sunset clauses inserted in the original document. See Amar,
supra note 128, at 1066. Some of the proposals to amend Article V are described in Susan,
supra note 147, at 321-26.
159. See, e.g., Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); The National Prohibition Cases,
253 U.S. 350 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); U.S. v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716
(1931) (all upholding the 18th amendment); Fairchild v, Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922); Leser
v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (upholding the 19th amendment).
160. In Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820), the Supreme Court, in deciding
when the Contracts Clause became effective, ruled that the ninth state sufficed to make the
Constitution operative. In so doing, the Court ignored the question of violating the amend-
ing procedures of the Articles. See also Brittle v. People, 1 Neb. 198, 210 (1873) (In the
course of a decision refusing to invalidate the Nebraska constitution for procedural flaws in
its adoption, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Constitution was valid, and
in line with the requirements of the Articles.).
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a. Constitutional Change by Judicial Interpretation
As a practical matter, constitutions are subject to change
outside their amending clauses wherever judicial interpretation is
permitted. In the United States the doctrine of judicial review, so
boldly stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,"'1
has been perhaps the most important feature of the constitutional
system. The Court has often served to reduce dissatisfaction with
the Constitution through interpretive rulings, thereby appeasing
the tendency to resort to constitutional amendment and deflecting
criticism of the rigorous requirements of Article V.
The judiciary has thus served to reinforce the idea that the
U.S. Constitution enjoys widespread popular consent. 62 For over
half of U.S. history under the Constitution, no amendments were
approved. But it would be naive to claim that these (1804-1865 and
1870-1913) were periods of constitutional contentment. Important
judicial decisions alleviated immediate crises through interpreta-
tion of the Constitution,163 although the judiciary did nothing to
help society avoid the cataclysm of the Civil War."6 While "judi-
cial activism" has been frequently accused of resulting in question-
able legal decisions, most of the ongoing political debates about the
proper role for the judiciary concern whether the activist agenda
will be conservative or liberal, not whether the courts should be
activist.16 5
b. The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
Ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment, the most important
source of constitutional protection against abuses of rights by state
governments, was itself proposed and adopted under circumstances
of dubious legality."' After the Civil War, the legislatures in the
161. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
162. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CON-
STITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
163. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Report of a Committee of the
New York State Bar Assoc., 13 REP. OF THE N.Y. ST. B.A. 140 (1890); Frederic Coudert,
Judicial Constitutional Amendment, As Illustrated by the Devolution of the Institution of
the Jury from a Fundamental Right to a Mere Method of Procedure, 13 YALE L.J. 331
(1904).
164. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
165. But see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
166. See generally HAROLD HYMAN AND WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
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Southern states were chosen under regulations imposed by federal
military governors. The Fourteenth Amendment was originated in
the Congress, then sent to the states for ratification. The Southern
states were included in the ratification process, even though they
were not yet represented in Congress and thus had no role in fash-
ioning or debating the proposed amendment.1 67
While the Southern states could have been excluded from the
ratification process on the same theory which excluded them from
Congress-that their rebellion justified their exclusion until they
demonstrated commitment to the Union-there were theoretical
and practical reasons for including the Southern states in the rati-
fication process. First, it had always been maintained that the re-
bellion was illegal. States could not simply secede through the re-
bellious actions of individuals,'68 they thus continued to exist as
legal entities. Second, it was by no means clear that ratification
would be possible without the votes of the Southern states."6 '
Tennessee ratified the Fourteenth Amendment soon after
Congress acted, but only after the governor told a special session of
the legislature that ratification was the state's ticket to readmis-
sion to the Union. There is no official record that these were the
terms for Tennessee's readmission. The common understanding as
reflected in the governor's speech, however, prompted quick pas-
sage with little debate after the absent members who opposed the
amendment were rounded up and held in custody to ensure a quo-
rum. 70 After the other Southern states rejected the amendment,
military reconstruction of the state governments occurred. Ratifi-
cation soon followed, even though many states suffered election ir-
regularities in the selection of new legislators.17 '
Some Northern states rescinded their ratification after the co-
erced votes in the South, but their rescissions were ignored. While
it had been argued by some members of Congress that three-
fourths of the Northern states would suffice for ratification, others
believed that all of the states should be counted. Even after the
Southern votes were counted, the Secretary of State issued con-
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1835-1875, at 115-231 (1982); Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013, 1063-69 (1984).
167. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 166, at 419-434.
168. Id. at 217.
169. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 322-23.
170. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 21 (1984).
171. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 322-24.
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flicting statements regarding ratification. Eventually, he published
a statement that the amendment was in force based not on his
view of the effectiveness of the ratification process but on a con-
gressional resolution stating that ratification had occurred.
172
Like the adoption of the Constitution, that of the Fourteenth
Amendment was irregular at best. In both instances the will of the
people prevailed over legality. Both victories were eventually vindi-
cated by history.
173
c. Constitutional Changes in the States
While Article V of the Constitution remains intact, most states
have modified their amending clauses.1 7' Some states distinguish
"amendment" from "revision," either in their amending clauses or
by including the equivalent of a "right to alter or abolish" clause
similar to the one in the Declaration of Independence.1
75 For exam-
ple, the current 1870 Constitution of Tennessee cites as its ena-
bling authority the "alter or abolish" clause of the 1834 Constitu-
tion, rather than the amending clause. '76 The 1870 Constitution's
amending clause was changed in a 1953 convention called by the
legislature, a method for amendment not explicitly contemplated
in the amending clause of the 1870 constitution. 17 The Tennessee
reformers, like those in Bogota and Philadelphia, acted outside
their legal authority.
On another occasion, a group of constitutional reformers did
not fare so well. From 1790 to 1842, Rhode Island was a state with-
out a constitution. The Dorr Rebellion, in 1841, called a People's
Convention to replace the 1663 colonial charter, which favored the
rich landowners, with a constitution that suited popular interests.
A large majority of voters ratified the people's constitution, and
rejected an alternative constitution drafted by the incumbent gov-
ernment. Yet, the efforts of the governor elected under the people's
constitution were thwarted when the incumbent refused to step
172. Id. at 322-23.
173. Thomas Powell, Changing Constitutional Phases, 19 B.U. L. REv. 509, 511-12
(1939) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment is effective notwithstanding its ratifica-
tion process).
174. See Sunsa, supra note 147, at 334-55 for a description of state histories of amend-
ing their amendment clauses.
175. Id. at 227-28.
176. TzNN. CONST. art. I, § 1.
177. Sunra, supra note 147, at 352.
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down on the grounds that the people's constitution had no ef-
fect. 78 President Tyler supported the incumbent with federal
troops while Dorr (the would-be governor) was arrested. The Dorr
Rebellion was defeated, and the incumbent government produced
a compromise constitution which the voters adopted in 1842.179
Two rebels prosecuted for their acts in support of Dorr's constitu-
tion pursued their claims before federal courts, but the U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to decide which one had been the legitimate
government of Rhode Island when the events occurred. 180
In 1935, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that its leg-
islature could call a constitutional convention under the constitu-
tional clause granting the "right to make and alter" the constitu-
tion, even though the amending clause said nothing about the
permissibility of conventions.181 According to the court, the people
of Rhode Island could "make and alter" the constitution through
"an explicit and authentic act of the whole people," which the
court construed to require a simple majority vote of the state elec-
torate, to ratify the convention's work. 182 It was held not necessary
that the people expressly vote to authorize the convention.
The 1849 constitution of California did not have the
equivalent of an "alter or abolish" clause. When reformers wanted
to replace the entire constitution, they first amended the amending
clause to provide for the possibility of wholesale change. 83 While
Californians could have adopted a new constitution without resort-
ing to the intermediate amendment, their effort to build an "alter
or abolish" clause into the constitution illustrates a simultaneous
commitment to positive law and to popular sovereignty.
The Iowa Constitution has an amendment clause and a provi-
sion stating that "all political power [lies] in the people." 18' When
the Iowa Legislature made procedural errors in passing a constitu-
tional amendment, and the people subsequently ratified it, the
Iowa Supreme Court held the amendment invalid. In this case, the
amendment was not rescued by the express recognition of popular
sovereignty in the Constitution. 8 '
178. Id. at 350-351
179. Id.
180. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
181. In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935).
182. Id. at 437.
183. Suama, supra note 147, at 229, 336.
184. IowA CONST. art. I, § 2.




Considering that a legal right to revolt may be a contradiction
in terms, the "alter or abolish" clauses likely reflect either a moral
right or a power to amend. That the Declaration of Independence
and virtually every "alter or abolish" clause in state constitutions
refer to the "inalienability" or "indefeasibility" of the right re-
minds us of an appeal to higher law. Together, the Rhode Island,
Iowa, and California examples reflect what centuries of constitu-
tionalism have taught-that sovereignty ultimately resides with
the people, above and beyond any statement in the positive law or
the authority of any court. When the people choose to prescribe
procedural rules for constitutional change, however, they may be
held to them by the courts.
Validation of revolutionary change must look beyond the legal
system to other values such as justice or necessity. If the change
fits the needs of the nation or state, it may be regarded as legiti-
mate notwithstanding the inability of a court or public official to so
adjudge it. Both the Framers in 1787 and the Congress after the
Civil War had practical and philosophical motives for their actions.
Practically, the Framers understood that their proposals simply
could not gain the unanimous approval of every legislature as re-
quired under the Articles. Likewise, the post-war Congress realized
that coercion would be required to obtain ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Philosophically, the Framers knew that a
stronger national government was essential, a government more
powerful than those able to veto an amendment to the Articles
would accept. They also believed that the new compact should be
between the government and the people, subject to their popular
approval by ratification. The 1866 Congress did not want to legiti-
mate the Southern States' secession.
The most distinctive contribution made by the revolutionaries
was not the reliance on popular sovereignty by itself, but instead
the institutional manifestation of popular sovereignty in the con-
stituent assemblies.1 86 Prior to the Philadelphia Convention, spe-
cial assemblies had fomented the Revolution and crafted some
state constitutions.18 After Philadelphia, the state ratifying con-
ventions effectively legitimated the constitutional revolution. In ef-
186. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERiCAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 342
(1969).
187. Id. at 279-309, 313-43.
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fect, the constituent ratifying assembly represented a reserved
power, an authority to correct mistakes made by the delegates. '
Admittedly, "the people" actually represented were of one race,
one gender, and wealthy. Further, it is still unclear whether those
who participated did in fact favor the new Constitution. 189 Still,
the ratification process made the debate national and, for the
times, remarkably open and democratic.' 90
Although the difficulty of the Article V amendment process
could easily have transformed dissatisfaction with the Constitution
into rebellion, the interpretive powers of the courts have helped
avert constitutional crises. As experiences in the states have
shown, the people themselves could ignore Article V and amend
the Constitution in some other way.' 9 ' That they have not done so
is a testament to the people's ambivalence and to the success of
the political system in deflecting, responding to, and absorbing po-
litical society's injustices. 92
C. Constitutional Legitimacy in Colombia
1. The 1886 Constitution
Given the historical events that led to its adoption, the legality
of Colombia's 1886 Constitution cannot be defended as an exercise
of existing constitution-making powers. It may be argued, however,
that not unlike the events surrounding the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, Nfifiez's convocation of the Council of Delegates and the sub-
sequent drafting of the Bases by the Council were merely propos-
als and did not violate the amendment provisions of Article 92 of
the 1863 Constitution. It was at the critical stage of ratification in
the United States, and at the vesting of constituent powers in the
National Council of Delegates in Colombia, that the old orders
were broken. Thus, legitimacy of the 1886 Constitution turns on
the source of the Municipal Councils' power to grant constituent
authority to the Delegates.
If the Municipal Councils in Colombia had been actually rep-
188. See the comments of Philadelphia delegate James Wilson in THE WORKS OF JAMES
WLSON 304 (McCloskey ed. 1967); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 131, at 432.
189. JACKSON MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-88, at 249
(1961).
190. Kay, supra note 31, at 74-5.
191. Amar, supra note 128, at 1054.
192. See KAMMEN, supra note 162, at 3-39 (1986).
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resentative of the people,1 98 popular sovereignty would have had
the same legitimating function in Colombia that it had in the U.S.
However, because the Councils were only representative of Ndfiez's
will,194 the legitimacy of the 1886 Constitution is inextricably tied
to the success of the President's rebellion against the pre-existing
order.
2. The 1991 Constitution
The political movements for constitutional reform of the late
1980s evolved in 1990 into a legal process. This process began with
Decree 1926 which afforded the electorate an opportunity to decide
whether a constitutional assembly should be convened and, if so,
to then elect its members and to define the limits of its powers. To
assess the legitimacy of the reform process, one must start with
Decree 1926 and the Court decision which upheld its validity.
a. The President's Power to Issue Decree 1926
Decree 1926 invokes Article 121 of the 1886 Constitution as
the source of its authority. In case of foreign war or domestic strife,
Article 121 vests in the Executive exceptional powers, including
temporary legislative authority. The Court has held that these
powers can only be exercised for the purpose of dealing with the
emergency giving rise to the declaration of "state of siege;" there
must be connectivity between the measures taken by the Executive
and the circumstances provoking the state of siege.
The majority had no difficulty in finding the requisite connec-
tivity. After quoting from its May 25 decision that upheld Decree
927,1 9 the Court stated that a "strengthening of the political insti-
tutions [was] necessary in order to face the diverse forms of attack
193. The Colombian Supreme Court makes this assumption in its October 9, 1990 deci-
sion, when it asserts that to question the people's power, as primary constituent, to adopt a
new constitution would cast doubts on the validity of the 1886 Constitution. Decision of
Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 1000 (Colom.).
194. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
195. The dissenters to the October 9, 1990 decision of the Colombian Supreme Court
recognized this when they argued that "only war victors (Gen. Tomfs Cipriano de Mosquera
in 1863 and President Nfifiez in 1886) resorted to extra-constitutional ways in order to jus-
tify the constitutions then adopted." Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. at
1017 (Colom.).
196. Decision of May 25, 1990, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. 542 (Colom.).
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to which public peace has been submitted." '97 The dissenters con-
ceded that, in general, there was sufficient connectivity.1 98 Never-
theless, they argued that, notwithstanding the need for reform, the
assembly could possibly concern itself with constitutional reforms
having no connection with the state of siege.'99 They also argued
that, since the President's legislative powers under Article 121 are
temporary, any legislation enacted under that Article should be
void once the emergency has passed. This being so, the adoption of
constitutional norms through "state of siege" mechanisms is inap-
propriate in light of the expectation of permanency that accompa-
nies a constitution.
2 0 0
Although the majority did not respond to the dissenters' argu-
ments, it appears that the dissent relies on the false premise that
the validity of the reform process depends on the scope of the
President's powers. The people, from whom the delegates to the
assembly derived their constitution-making power, are not bound
by the limitations that Article 121 imposes on the President. It was
not the President, but the people through the assembly, who even-
tually adopted constitutional changes unrelated to the causes of
the state of siege and gave them permanent character.
b. Achieving Peace
The majority argued that the validity of Decree 1926 was to be
judged taking into account "its virtuality to achieve peace."' 20 1 Ac-
cording to the dissent, by engaging in this "voluntaristic determi-
nation as to whether a constitutional assembly is convenient for
the country because of its aptness to secure peace, '20 2 the majority
abandoned its constitutionally prescribed role.20 3 It invaded the
policy-making sphere reserved to the legislature.20 4 The decision,
in the dissenters' eyes, threatened to transform the constitutional
jurisdiction into "a spurious exercise of active governmental func-
tions" and the Court into a third house of the legislature .20 The
197. Decision of Oct. 9, 1990, 19 J. & D. at 997.
198. Id. at 1026.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 999.
202. Id. at 1008.
203. Id. at 1007.




dissenters concluded that "to adopt the criterion of determining
the validity of a legal norm in light of its utility or inutility to
achieve peace is to fall into the most aberrant subjectivism, and
[would place the country], not in the sphere of values, but of jurid-
ical uncertainty and arbitrariness. "206
However, the Court's decision does not itself judge the efficacy
of constitutional amendments in bringing about peace. Instead, the
Court states that "although it is impossible to assure that the De-
cree will necessarily lead to the longed for peace, this Court cannot
foreclose that possibility."20 1 The majority thus recognized that it
was not the Court's role to second-guess the President's political
choice of consulting the electorate about the desirability of a con-
stitutional amendment through a popularly elected assembly. Any
other decision would, indeed, have engaged the Court in the politi-
cal activism that the dissenters so strongly criticize and would have
put the Court on a collision course with the people's will as ex-
pressed on May 27. 1990.
c. The Decree and the People's Primary Constituent Power
The Court's principal argument is that the people's power to
change the Constitution is unlimited 08 as reflected in Article 2 of
the 1886 Constitution: "Sovereignty resides essentially and exclu-
sively with the Nation, and therefrom all public powers emanate
. . .. " However, as the dissenters pointed out, Article 2 does not
state that the people have sovereign powers. In their view, the Ar-
ticle was needed to ensure and clarify the transition between the
federal system of 1863 (in which the several states claimed to be
sovereign) and the unitary system adopted in 1886, when one, and
only one, State could claim to be the reconstituted Colombian Na-
tion.20 9 The dissenters' historical interpretation of Article 2, how-
ever, is belied by the fact that long before any transition from fed-
eralism to centralism Colombian Constitutions included provisions
similar to Article 2.210
206. Id. at 1011.
207. Id. at 999.
208. Id. at 1000-02.
209. Id. at 1027.
210. See, e.g., CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPfJBLICA DE COLOMBIA art. 2 (1821) ("Sovereignty
essentially resides with the nation"); CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE COLOMBIA art. 3
(1830) ("Sovereignty radically resides with the Nation. Therefrom all political powers ema-
nate which can only be exercised under the terms of this Constitution.").
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Straddling this indeterminacy, the Court ultimately gave pre-
eminence to the will of the electorate and refused to stand in the
way of a highly popular mechanism for constitutional change. In
doing so, the majority decision conformed with the principle of
popular sovereignty, but begged the question of whether Article 2
did indeed give the people the power they were already in the pro-
cess of exercising. The dissenters strayed even further from the
mark by purporting to rely on a historical analysis of Article 2 and
then going out of their way to legitimize the 1957 plebiscite that
was not in issue, by arguing that it is only when there is institu-
tional chaos " that Article 2 confers upon the people the power to
change the constitution outside of the amending clause.
d. Limitations on the Assembly's Powers
The Court concluded that Decree 1926, to the extent that it
prescribed the topics that the assembly could address, contained a
limitation on the powers of the people to amend the constitu-
tion.1 2 In the majority's view, this limitation of subject matter was
an attempt by the Executive to limit the people's election of the
assembly to enumerated and limited powers. Thus, the decree im-
permissibly restricted the primary constituent power. "
The political agreement of August 2nd as incorporated in De-
cree 1926, disabled the assembly from "modify[ing] the period of
those [officials] elected [in 1990], or matters that affect obligations
of the Colombian State by virtue of international treaties, or the
Republican System of Government." These were the only effective
limitations suggested by the political parties and the government,
because the list of subjects that the assembly could study and
amend was so comprehensive as to enable a sweeping amendment
of the 1886 Constitution.
The first of these limitations, dealing with the assembly's in-
competence to modify the term of public officials elected in 1990,
represents an obvious attempt by the politicians to protect their
own interests. If the limitation had been sustained, Congress could
211. According to the dissent, this was the situation in 1957 when Colombians adopted
constitutional amendments through a plebiscite, because then Congress had been closed, a
dictator had just relinquished power, and the government was in the hands of a non-repre-
sentative body. Decision of Oct. 9, Corte Suprema, 19 J. & D. at 1017 (Colom.).




have enacted, before the end of the 1990-1994 legislative term, an
Article 218 constitutional amendment reversing these modifica-
tions introduced by the assembly that were not favored by current
members of Congress. The majority may have reasoned that if the
assembly wanted to introduce substantial reforms of Congress, its
success could depend on an immediate dissolution of the present
Congress and its replacement by a new one elected under the new
rules.
The second limitation dealt with matters related to the coun-
try's obligations under existing international treaties. Of the nu-
merous treaties to which Colombia is a party, only two have gener-
ated public controversy in recent years. One is the Concordat, a
treaty between Colombia and the Holy See, which practically out-
laws divorce by refering marital disputes among citizens who cele-
brate a Catholic marriage to Church tribulals21 ' The other is the
extradition treaty with the United States. 15 It is unclear whether
the majority, in eliminating this restriction to the assembly's pow-
ers, had in mind the opening of an opportunity for the assembly to
free Colombian Catholics from the marital bond and Colombian
drug traffickers from prosecution in the U.S.
The majority's rationale for striking down all subject matter
limitations on the assembly is plausible only in two scenarios.
First, if Decree 1926 effectively curtailed the people's sovereign
power, the limitations were obviously unconstitutional. Second, if
the May 27 plebiscite created a nascent constitutional assembly
whose members were to be elected at some later time and, simulta-
neously, transferred the people's sovereign power to this abstract
entity, any attempt to limit the latter's competence would also be
unconstitutional. The first is not persuasive because the proposed
limitations would become effective, if at all, only with the people's
approval in the December 1990 vote; they would have been, there-
fore, self-imposed. The second hypothesis, although not articulated
in the October 9 opinion, and expressly disavowed in the Court's
May 25 decision,21 is the only position consistent with the major-
ity's view of Decree 1926. By virtue of this change of heart, the
electorate's response to Decree 927 became the foundation of the
reform process. The expression of the sovereign will on May 27
214. Concordat between Colombia and the Holy See of June 12, 1973.
215. Treaty of Sept. 14, 1979, supra note 83.




created a profound political fact that neither the Executive nor the
judiciary could neglect. While the Executive understood its man-
date to take all necessary steps to put the process into motion, the
Court was certainly aware of what occurred on May 27 when a ma-
jority decided to abandon years of strict constructionism of Article
218 of the Constitution in order to uphold the process.
IV. COLOMBIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE
Popular sovereignty became a talisman in revolutionary
America. This slogan was conveniently used for political purposes
by the Framers in 1787, by the ratifiers after that, and by Chief
Justice Marshall when he sought to justify the doctrine of judicial
review. In the same way that the U.S. constitutional model has
been widely exported, so has the concept of popular sovereignty
and its capacity to serve political ends.
The Colombians have embarked upon fundamental reform in
the name of the people. Their new Constitution is real, a political
fact. A Colombian legal scholar has maintained that the leading
constitutional scholars in Colombia "all share the same view of
constitutionalism as legal craftsmanship and constitutions as in-
struments for governments and parties to impose political order as
well as social peace on warring but perfectible Colombians. '2 17 Ac-
cording to Valencia, constitutional reformism "works as an effica-
cious strategy of self-legitimation through which the leading clas-
ses and parties have attempted to create a consensus and
succeeded to prevent a change."218 Writing in 1986, Valencia could
not foresee the reform of 1990-91. Perhaps he would regard the
new Constitution as still another victory of the forces of order, pur-
chased from those who hold the nation hostage at the price of con-
stitutional integrity.
21 9
It is unclear whether the invocation of popular sovereignty to
legitimate the reform process in Bogota reflects a genuine public
demand for a new set of societal rules and institutions. Instead, it
could simply be another episode of constitutional reform serving as
a shield to protect the less populist and shorter term political goals
of those in power. Legally, it makes no difference. The Colombian
electorate indicated by plebiscite that they wanted a chance to
217. VALENCLU, supra note 1, at 27.
218. Id. at 39-40.
219. Id. at 198-99, 201.
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vote for a constitutional assembly, and did just that by conferring
their primary sovereignty upon a popularly elected body.
The legitimacy of a society's first organizing princi-
ple-popular sovereignty in Colombia and in the United States-is
dependent upon its continuing acceptance by the people. While ac-
ceptance must be measured over time, the efficacy of the process
for promulgating the new Colombian Constitution remains impor-
tant. Whether Colombians arrive at consensus or not will depend
in part upon their reaction to that process.
Some in Colombia have rejected the new Constitution as being
simply illegal-unauthorized by the prior constitution. Others ob-
ject to the political concessions made in constituting the assembly,
and the presence there of recently active terrorists. Others have
the perception that the assembly decided to ban extradition of
drug traffickers only because it had a metaphorical gun at its col-
lective head. Cynics might take some solace, however, in recalling
the true nature of the covenant made by the Philadelphia dele-
gates in 1787 and later ratified by representatives of the people.
Democracy was hardly the watchword in 1787. Most power given
to the federal government was taken from the states, which had
been closest to the people, their desires, and needs. The invocation
of popular sovereignty during the constitution-making period was
at least as much a political ploy as a reflection of a social principle.
The nationalists simply had to find a way to circumvent state sov-
ereignty in order to get their plan adopted.220 Popular acceptance
of the Constitution was to some extent assured at the outset by the
provision of Article VII which calls for ratification by state conven-
tions and not by legislatures. Yet, Article V does not permit popu-
lar initiatives, the most direct measure of popular consent, as a
method of constitutional amendment.22 Hart concedes that
"[flailure to exercise an amending power as complex in its manner
of exercise as that in the United States Constitution, may be a
poor sign of the wishes of the electorate, though often a reliable
sign of its ignorance and indifference. 22 2 Popular sovereignty was,
in part, a fiction.22 3 It remains, in part, a fiction.
220. See KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 12-28.
221. For a discussion of the anti-democratic possibilities attending Article V, see Peter
Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional Amendments: Federalism Versus Democ-
racy, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 409 (1987).
222. HART CONcEPT, supra note 102, at 76.




In the United States, the prospects for a general long-term ac-
ceptance of the Constitution would not have seemed especially
good in 1789. The ratification debates were bitter and divided, and
many continued to charge that the Constitution was a plan by the
rich to create an aristocracy. The opposition subsided quickly, due
partly to a recognition that a democratic act had been done, partly
because the new system seemed less radical and therefore prefera-
ble to the obvious alternatives.22 Subsequently slavery, secession,
and the Civil War threatened the Constitution. But the Civil War
settled the secession question, and the post-war Amendments,
technically adopted in violation of Article V, helped to add mo-
mentum to a constitutional system whose legitimacy was growing
every day.
The new Colombian Constitution may also gain legitimacy
over time through popular acceptance. The problem with the ac-
ceptance theory is that it may reflect only a fictional legitimacy.
Acceptance is normally manifested largely by acquiescence and ad-
herence by the masses to the will of the public officials. Although
citizen understanding of the legal system is theoretically required,
public participation is not.225 Thus, on the one hand, the accept-
ance theory liberates insofar as it permits self-amendment, even of
the most basic norms. On the other hand, judging the efficacy of a
legal system by reference to the acquiescence or the mere obedi-
ence of the people would amount to a toleration of almost any legal
system, no matter how cruel or barbaric. It could even validate a
system where the people are oppressed through either coercion or
social conditions and not permitted reasonable participation in
governance.
This Article has shown that the condition of constitutional le-
gitimacy is dependent upon local circumstances. Nonetheless, the
experience of state and federal constitution-making in the United
States provides a helpful comparative perspective from which the
Colombian reforms may be viewed. United States history has
shown that popular sovereignty may legitimate a new charter with
or without an opportunity for popular ratification. While ratifica-
tion in state conventions was remarkably effective in marshalling
224. See Kay, supra note 31, at 67-70.
225. See HAT CONcmr, supra note 102, at 76. Hart's acceptance theory has been criti-
cized, fairly in our view, for not dealing with the relationship between the people and the
officials in manifesting acceptance. See Gabriel Mosonyi, Legal Obligation, Social Accept-
ance and the Separation of Law and Morals, 6 CONN. L. REV. 36, 37 n.14 (1973).
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support and diffusing disagreement with the new federal Constitu-
tion, several states produced effective republican constitutions
without ratification.22 6 Perhaps Colombia has too.
In at least one sense, the recent process of constitutional re-
form in Colombia began more democratically than the 1787 United
States counterpart. The plebiscite that produced the Consti-
tuyente in Colombia involved the people directly in convoking the
assembly and electing nearly all of its members. Dissimilarly, the
Philadelphia delegates were chosen by the state legislatures after
these representative bodies voted to join the Convention. In con-
trast, Article 380 of the new Colombian Constitution declares that
it is effective "from the day of its promulgation."
By not providing for popular ratification of the new Colom-
bian Constitution the people and the assembly may have missed
an opportunity to enhance the worth of their hard work. The Co-
lombian people no doubt delegated their constituent power to the
assembly. But, the new Colombian Constitution could have been
presented, like the United States Constitution, as a proposal to the
people. Popular ratification accomplishes two important things.
First, it gives the people another chance to decide whether they
want a new charter, this time with the proposal in front of them.
With an opportunity for popular ratification, the Colombian elec-
torate could have more effectively decided whether the new Consti-
tution "strengthen[s] the democratic-participatory system of gov-
ernment through representative mechanisms" as they called for in
their May 1990 plebiscite. Second, popular ratification more effec-
tively counters the positivist argument that the new Constitution
was not authorized and is therefore illegal. Treating the new docu-
ment as a proposal for the people, produced by an assembly
elected by the people, and requiring their approval would have
been an unequivocal exercise of primary sovereignty. After such a
showing of popular support for reform, the positivist would have
had to concede its legitimacy or admit that Colombians must for-
ever live with Article 218 of the 1886 Constitution or resort to a
golpe de estado.
As noted earlier,22 any measure of a constitution's acceptance
must take into account the difficulty of constitutional amend-
226. FARlE & SHERRY, supra note 12, at 38; see also RI. CONST. arts. 7, 21 of the Bill
of Rights; SUtER, supra note 147, at 351.
227. See text following supra note 114.
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ments. The amending processes in the Articles of Confederation
and in Colombia's 1863 Constitution were too onerous, requiring
unanimous ratification by every local legislature. In Colombia, Ar-
ticle 218 of the 1886 Constitution may have been unfair in granting
exclusive amending power to a legislature which was not actually
representative. 2 8 In the United States, there have been periodic
and ongoing debates concerning the difficulty of the Article V pro-
cess. Hundreds of proposals have been introduced in Congress to
make the process easier, always in the context of the sponsor's fa-
vorite substantive reform.
The new Colombian Constitution broadens considerably the
options for amendment. Three alternative methods are permitted:
By special legislation of the Congress (like the predecessor Article
218), by calling of a special constitutional assembly, or by referen-
dum of the people.2 29 Before the present equivalent of Article 218
process may begin, ten members of Congress, twenty percent of the
municipal or departmental legislatures, or five percent of the regis-
tered voters must present a legislative proposal for amendment to
Congress. As in the past, Congress must consider the measure in
two consecutive sessions. Upon approval by a majority of those in
attendance in the first session, the proposal is published by the
government. In the second congressional session, no changes may
be debated or considered that were not introduced in the first ses-
sion. To become effective, the amendment must be approved by a
majority of the members of both houses of Congress in the second
session.2s°
The constitutional reform process of 1990-91 is expressly sanc-
tioned in the new Constitution. Instead of the relatively unfettered
process that saw President Barco call for the plebiscite that began
the recent reform, the new Constitution permits Congress to order
a plebiscite through the enactment of ordinary legislation. If at
least one third of eligible voters vote for the creation of a special
constitutional assembly, a special election follows and the right of
Congress to amend the Constitution on its own volition is sus-
pended. The elected assembly then adopts its own procedural reg-
ulations, subject to Congress determining, in its statute calling for
the plebiscite,' the "competence, period and composition" of the
228. See VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 46; VAzQuzz, supra note 33, at 19.
229. COLOM. CONST. art. 374.
230. Id. art. 375.




A public referendum to amend the Constitution occurs either
to negate certain amendments approved by Congress, or to adopt
new constitutional provisions. If Congress enacts an amendment
concerning fundamental rights listed in the Constitution, or affect-
ing the mechanism of popular participation created by the new
Constitution, or concerning Congress in general, then five percent
of the voters may act within six months of its enactment to request
a referendum to defeat the new provision. The amendment is de-
feated by a majority vote of at least one quarter of eligible vot-
ers.23 2 Additionally, the Executive or five percent of eligible voters
can propose to Congress the calling of a referendum on constitu-
tional amendments whose text must be incorporated in the statute
ordering the referendum. In this case, the voters must be given the
opportunity to pass separately upon each theme or article of the
amendment.2" Finally, the new Constitution provides that amend-
ments, however made, are subject to review for constitutionality,
within one year of their enactment and then only to determine




These changes enhance democratic government and promise
to be a more accurate measure of citizen acceptance of the Consti-
tution. The longstanding practice of amendment by special legisla-
tion is retained, but local officials and voters are given more practi-
cal access to the system, while the constitutional assembly is
expressly recognized. The election of a constitutional assembly
may be held only if one-third of the eligible voters approve. Like-
wise, the referendum provides the people with a check on the Con-
gress if that body becomes too willing to amend the Constitution's
protection of individual rights. The extent to which the new provi-
sions for amendment manage to straddle the gulf between making
change too easy to protect fundamental values and too hard to en-
sure effective consent will, once again, become clearer over time. Of
course, whatever the character of the amending provisions, no posi-
tive law can ever abrogate the primary sovereign power. The Co-
lombian reformers must simply trust that the populist methods
232. Id. art. 377.
233. Id. art. 378. This provision is apparently in response to the events surrounding the
1957 plebiscite, when voters faced a comprehensive list of reforms and could only approve or
reject the entire package.
234. COLOM. CoNsT. art. 379.
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now available will forestall the impulse to abandon the Constitu-
tion. While the failure to amend a constitution due to a burden-
some amending clause is an imperfect measure of continuing con-
sent,235 courts can and do play a critical role in fashioning and
indicating popular consent by interpreting constitutions. In both
the United States and Colombia, constitutional change has oc-
curred through judicial interpretation. Consistent with the accept-
ance theory, citizen consent to a constitution may be determined
either by reference to what the courts say or to what the funda-
mental rules themselves provide. As the courts in the United
States have sought to mold the Constitution to changing times, the
fiction of popular sovereignty has served to bind the nation and
provide stability, while judges have diminished the consequences
of the myth for the people by protecting them from majoritarian
processes and originalist interpretations of the Constitution. '36 Co-
lombia has had a similar experience with judicial review since the
beginning of this century. 37
Will this episode of "lawlessness" breed disregard for the stat-
ure of the Constitution in Colombia? Probably not. Although the
1886 Constitution lasted for more than one hundred years, Colom-
bia's juridical and constitutional history suggests that the 1991 re-
form falls into the pattern of constitutional changes made during
times of crisis.23 8 Moreover, constitutional change is arduous, it re-
quires commitment and seriousness of purpose. Rather than breed-
ing disrespect for law, the possibility of constitutional change
outside the existing rules for change reminds us of the responsibil-
ity lawyers have to make law accessible, understandable, and just.
As citizens and lawyers, we are bound by our existing rules,
but not irrevocably. Because of self-imposed procedural rules we
cannot uniformally modify or ignore laws we do not like. Yet, we
can persuade those who hold the primary sovereign power to seek
fundamental constitutional revision, including changing the rule
for change itself. We can and must shape the rules of change them-
selves, so that they fairly but not too easily permit the popular will
to call for reform. We can remain watchful for unacceptable rules,
235. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. Rav. 204, 236-37 (1980).
236. See KAMMEN, supra note 7, at 14. See generally WILLIAM WIECEK, LMERTY UNDER
LAW: THE SuPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1988); KAMMEN, supra note 162, at 29-39
(1986).
237. See VALENCIA, supra note 1, at 202.
238. Id. at 42-44.
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and we must do so. Finally, when fundamental change is made
through an exercise of popular will, our perspective shifts, but our
responsibility as lawyers and citizens remains.
